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I. INTRODUCTION
The medical–legal partnership movement was born from recogni-
tion of the complexity that poverty imposes on health.1  While health
conditions do not generally discriminate based on economic status,
remedies certainly do.  For example, wealthy children can and do suf-
fer from asthma, but unlike a poor child with asthma, a wealthy
child’s family has the means to eliminate environmental factors that
may be aggravating it.  A poor child’s family, without a lawyer, may
have no ability to force the landlord to remove the mold, insects, or
rodents that may be aggravating the child’s condition and no ability to
simply move to better housing.
Dr. Barry Zuckerman, Chief of Pediatrics at Boston Medical
Center, is credited with recognizing this and creating a model medi-
cal–legal partnership in 1993 that has since been replicated in more
than twenty states across the country.2  The partnerships are loosely
defined, some consisting of simply generating legal referral resources
for doctors to refer their patients.  However, in its most effective form,
medical–legal partnerships are formal partnerships between a doc-
tor’s office and a lawyer’s office wherein the partners train each other
regularly about medical and legal definitions, medical and legal obli-
gations, medical and legal issues that are interconnected, and work
together to solve their patients’/clients’ medical/legal problems.  Attor-
neys, doctors, educators, and policymakers have lauded these innova-
tive interdisciplinary partnerships created to serve low-income
communities.3  Commentators have written articles enthusiastically
1. ELIZABETH TOBIN TYLER ET AL., POVERTY, HEALTH AND LAW: READINGS AND CASES
FOR MEDICAL-LEGAL PARTNERSHIP (Carolina Academic Press 2011); see also THE
NAT’L CTR. FOR MED. LEGAL P’SHIP, www.medical-legalpartnership.org (last vis-
ited March 6, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/G66R-GLAW (providing
general information regarding the medical-legal partnership movement).
2. See Randye Retkin, Esq. et al., Lawyers and Doctors Working Together—A Formi-
dable Team, HEALTH LAW., Oct. 2007, at 33, 34; Elizabeth Tobin-Tyler, Esq., Ho-
listic and Collaborative Approaches to Practicing Law and Medicine, R.I. BUS. J.,
May–June 2009, at 37 (referring to Dr. Zuckerman as having had the “novel” idea
of creating a medical–legal partnership that launched a national movement); Syl-
via Pagan Westphal, Lawyers Help Patients Solve Problems: National Network
Connects Medical-Legal Programs Aiding Low Income Families, WALL ST. J.,
April 11, 2006, at D3.
3. See Amy Kilelea, Collaborative Lawyering Meets Collaborative Doctoring: How a
Multidisciplinary Partnership for HIV/AIDS Services Can Improve Outcomes for
the Marginalized Sick, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 413 (2009); Charity
Scott, Doctors as Advocates, Lawyers as Healers, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y
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endorsing these partnerships, sharing success stories and urging the
continued creation of many more.4
This Article joins this chorus in favor of the creation of medi-
cal–legal partnerships, focusing on one particular population, the low-
income disabled.5  An examination of this population’s treatment
within the disability income system6 reveals, however, a startling dis-
covery.  Medical–legal partnerships, in the effective form described
above, were utilized by government and private industry in their re-
view and adjudication of claims decades before Dr. Zuckerman’s ac-
tions became a movement.7  Government and private industry have
created medical–legal partnerships to process claims and those part-
331 (2008); Elizabeth Tobin-Tyler, Allies Not Adversaries: Teaching Collabora-
tion to the Next Generation of Advocates, Doctors and Lawyers to Address Social
Inequality, 11 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 331 (2008); Westphal, supra note 2 R
(“ ‘It’s very exciting.  Dr. Zuckerman has really been a visionary,’ says Eileen Oue-
lette, president of the American Academy of Pediatrics.  The medical-aid pro-
grams have helped fill a gap created by the stagnation of federal funding for low-
income legal aid, says Don Saunders, director of civil legal services at the Na-
tional Legal Aid & Defender Association in Washington.”).
4. See Stacy L. Brustin, Legal Services Provision Through Multidisciplinary Prac-
tice—Encouraging Holistic Advocacy While Protecting Ethical Interests, 73 U.
COLO. L. REV. 787 (2002); Kilela, supra note 3; Tina Rosenberg, Op-Ed, When R
Poverty Makes You Sick, A Lawyer Can be the Cure, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2014,
http://nyti.ms/1nCBPjh, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/FU8A-2667.
5. “Low-income” is a term that often has very specific definitions.  However, for pur-
poses of this Article, I am speaking more generally of those persons who, whether
they might have once worked and been well above any kind of federal poverty
guideline definition, are, upon becoming disabled and unable to work, without
any other source of income or support and therefore in need of some kind of disa-
bility income benefit to survive.  In addition, of course, I am including in my dis-
cussion those persons who have never worked and always lived at or below the
federal poverty level.
6. There are a variety of benefits that a disabled person can claim, ranging from
social security disability income benefits, to short- and long-term disability in-
come benefits available through a disability insurance policy, to worker’s compen-
sation benefits, and other debt-relief benefits available for student loans or
through mortgage insurance policies, credit card insurance policies, etc.  All of
these benefits require medical documentation to verify that the claimant meets
the definition of disability proscribed either by law or regulation or by a particu-
lar insurance policy.  Medical–legal partnerships on behalf of disabled indigent
persons who are applying for any of these benefits are critical.  However, this
paper will only focus on the need for medical–legal partnerships within the con-
text of social security disability income benefits and long-term disability income
benefits provided through employer benefit plans.
7. See Vernellia R. Randall, Managed Care, Utilization Review, and Financial Risk
Shifting: Compensating Patients for Health Care Cost Containment Injuries, 17
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1993) (discussing Congress’s development of
Peer Review Organizations in the 1970s and 80s, composed of physicians, respon-
sible for conducting utilization review for services provided under the Medicare
Program, which took many forms, such as preadmission review for scheduled
hospitalizations, retrospective claims review, and admissions review for un-
scheduled hospitalizations).
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nerships have exploited the differences in definition and perspective
between the medical and legal professionals involved in assisting the
disabled.8  Therefore, as this Article argues, medical–legal partner-
ships on behalf of the low-income disabled are not only beneficial but
are, in fact, ethically required.
Lawyers and doctors for impoverished communities struggle not
only with the complexity that poverty imposes on their clients’/pa-
tients’ lives but also with their own resource limitations which make
effectively managing their practices extremely difficult.  Lawyers or
doctors for the poor will have to forgo hiring investigators, ordering
multiple diagnostic tests, filing multiple claims, or prescribing multi-
ple treatments unless they can find creative ways to fund those activi-
ties.  While it is perfectly understandable, even expected, that such
“luxuries” will indeed be absent from a poverty lawyer or doctor’s rep-
resentation/treatment, there is a legitimate question whether these
same lawyers and doctors are acting ethically when they “represent”
or “treat” their clients/patients without these tools.  It becomes a ques-
tion, of course, of what is minimally necessary for ethical representa-
tion/treatment.9  This question is answered, in part, by the literature
regarding the boundaries of ethical representation/treatment.
With respect to lawyers, some argue that “zealousness” on the part
of the lawyer requires unlimited advocacy, regardless of ability to
pay,10 and some attempt to impose a boundary on the ethical repre-
sentation of poor people by seeking to add considerations of the com-
munity to the calculus.11  Others argue the opposite, that poverty
lawyering is absolutely limited by the resources of the lawyer and the
8. Id.
9. Note that “medical ethics” or the “ethical obligations” of a doctor have been said
to encompass three separable, though overlapping concepts.  These have been re-
ferred to as “decorum,”or more simply the virtues of a doctor as a moral being; the
deontological aspects of ethical medical practice consisting more of rules to be
followed; and what at least one author has described as “politic ethic”—those
practices that recognize that a doctor’s care occurs in and has ramifications for a
community.  See ALBERT R. JONSEN, A SHORT HISTORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS (2000),
for a lengthier and more detailed discussion.  As I am addressing the practical
constraints of ethical medical practice, I will be referring primarily to the deonto-
logical concept of medical ethics.  As Jonsen suggests, however, the concepts are
not mutually exclusive and moral conceptions of ethical practice, even when con-
sidered more broadly, support rather than undermine the contention that re-
source limitations do not excuse interdisciplinary incompetence.
10. Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity
and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REV. 337, 355–56 (1978);
Michelle S. Jacobs, Legal Professionalism: Do Ethical Rules Require Zealous Rep-
resentation for Poor People?, 8 ST. THOMAS  L. REV. 97, 110 (1995).
11. Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice,
37 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1136 (1990).
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client, and that this is ethical.12  With respect to doctors, the debate is
substantially similar, focusing on the fiduciary duties of the doctor
and when and how that relationship requires “advocacy.”13
Part II of this Article will provide an ethical analysis of the doctor
and lawyer role.  Specifically examining the boundaries of the fiduci-
ary obligations of the doctor and the zealous advocacy obligations of
the lawyer, it is clear that effective fulfillment of these obligations re-
quires interdisciplinary partnership14 work when seeking to treat and
represent the low-income disabled.  Claims of inability to do so for
those that cannot pay only exacerbate the very problems that ade-
quate fulfillment of these obligations is meant to ameliorate: poverty,
poor health, and dependence.
In addition to examining the literature regarding the roles and eth-
ical obligations of lawyers and doctors, the question of the boundaries
of those roles and obligations is also answered by looking at the spe-
cific context of the litigation in question.  When attempting to assist a
disabled person who has no source of income (and little financial sup-
port from loved ones), it is important to understand the practical reali-
ties faced by that person upon applying for a benefit to which she is
lawfully entitled.
Part III will bolster the argument that ethical fulfillment of the
obligations discussed in Part I requires interdisciplinary partnership
work by providing a brief historical analysis of disability claims adju-
dication.  As disability claims have risen in both the government and
private sectors, courts and legislatures have struggled to find ways to
fairly adjudicate these claims without bankrupting either the govern-
ment or the disability insurance companies involved.  This struggle
gave rise to a number of rules, some judicially created and some legis-
12. Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 10, at 354.  Bellow and Kettleson refer to an ABA R
Opinion that said many lawyers believe that due to resource constraints failure
to advocate completely zealously is an understandable and perhaps even justifia-
ble lapse of the poverty lawyer.  However, note that the committee then went on
to state that lack of resources on the part of the lawyer is not a justification for
failing to fulfill ethical obligations and representation that is not sufficiently zeal-
ous or diligent violates Canon 6 of the ABA model rules.  ABA Comm. on Ethics &
Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1359 (1976).
13. See LAURENCE B. MCCULLOUGH, JOHN GREGORY AND THE INVENTION OF PROFES-
SIONAL MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE PROFESSION OF MEDICINE 3 (1998); L. Schwartz,
Is There an Advocate in the House?  The Role of Health Care Professionals in Pa-
tient Advocacy, 28 J. MED. ETHICS 37 (2002).
14. I use the term, “interdisciplinary partnership” to encompass partnerships that
are much deeper than simply acting as a mutual referral resource.  I refer to a
partnership where both partners understand and educate one another about
their respective roles and role conflicts, how those roles impact obligations to pa-
tients/clients, as well as their use of language, terms, and perspective.  Addition-
ally, the partners should understand and educate one another about barriers to
patient/client service and whether these can be overcome with a review of the
patient/client’s problem through the other profession’s lens.
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latively created, which were meant to aid in this process but ulti-
mately only served to heighten the inability of physicians to provide
effective medical opinion evidence without enlisting the interdiscipli-
nary support of their lawyer colleagues.
The courts, as the final arbiters of disability-related claims deci-
sions, have unwittingly supported and widened the gap between medi-
cal opinion and legal definition.  They have done so by making
repeated pronouncements that nontreating physicians, often paid by
the very persons making the legal decisions regarding disability, can
provide evidence as worthy of weight as that of treating physicians.
This judicial recognition of insurer or government-created defense
mechanisms has resulted in the increasing institutionalization of in-
surer or government medical–legal partnerships.  As these partner-
ships have become more sophisticated and entrenched, a disabled
patient’s application, resting solely on the isolated treating physician’s
record, is doomed to fail.
In Part IV we will see precisely why an isolated treating physi-
cian’s record is doomed to fail.  I will analyze the legal requirements
for most disability-related benefits and distinguish those require-
ments from doctor goals in creating treatment records.  Specifically, I
will examine the traditional role expectations of doctors and how cur-
rent legal expectations are in conflict with more traditional views of
the role of doctors.
In Part V, I will return to our discussion of lawyer and doctor eth-
ics.  Recognizing the origins of the interdisciplinary partnership ulti-
mately supports the current medical–legal partnership movement but
requires a stronger ethical response from doctors and lawyers.  The
disabled must have access to doctors and lawyers who work as full
interdisciplinary partners on behalf of their low-income disabled pa-
tients/clients.  This necessity is starkly revealed when the tools that
have been used to deny claims are acknowledged.
II. ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS BEYOND
RESOURCE LIMITATIONS
While we are all familiar with the Hippocratic admonition to “do no
harm,” it is less clear how far this obligation extends.  The literature
surrounding ethical obligations of doctors helpfully delineates the eth-
ical obligations as fiduciary in nature.15  A fiduciary has been defined
as “someone who is required to act for the benefit of another per-
son . . . .  Generally, one person stands in a fiduciary role to another
when that person, due to special training, expertise, or other qualifica-
15. Scott, supra note 3, at 331. See also Tyler, supra note 2, n.4 (citing Tracy v. Mer- R
rell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 569 N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ohio 1991)).
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tion, holds potential power and influence over the other.”16  It is pre-
cisely this power imbalance that ethics seeks to address by “imposing
duties of care and loyalty on the fiduciary.”17
Laurence McCullough traces this concept to one first introduced by
John Gregory in the late 18th Century.18  Gregory, through his teach-
ings and writings, developed a defined physician–patient relationship,
with associated morally-based behaviors, in response to a list of
problems relating to the commercial manner in which medicine was
then practiced.19  As described in great detail by McCullough, the re-
lationship and practice of medicine at the time was primarily driven
by the patient and her purse rather than by a sense of independent
professional duty.20  Gregory sought to solve this problem by high-
lighting for his students the importance of creating a relationship gov-
erned by a patient’s needs but bounded by a physician’s judgment.21
Meeting patient demands, regardless of how medically sound such de-
mands were, most often resulted in danger to the patient.22  Similarly,
however, dictating treatment plans without regard to the patient’s ex-
press or implied concerns also resulted in danger to the patient.23
Gregory wrote extensively about the importance of sympathy as a vir-
tue for the physician—sympathy that required the physician to put
his patient’s needs before his own by listening, expressing curiosity
about the patient’s life, seriously considering patient suggestions and
patient capabilities, and taking all of this into account when prescrib-
ing treatment.24  The imposition of Humean concepts of sympathy,
trustworthiness and compassion forged a physician–patient relation-
ship where before there was merely a push and pull between patient
and physician.25  This relationship, and its moral boundaries, are
what Gregory created and what became, in a modern articulation, the
basis for what we call the fiduciary relationship between physician
and patient.26
This understanding is helpful to determining a kind of floor for
medical ethics but not a ceiling.  Why this is important is aptly illus-
trated in Charity Scott’s article, Doctors as Advocates, Lawyers as
Healers.27  Professor Scott begins the article by recounting her health-
16. Scott, supra note 3, at 334. R
17. Id. at 334.
18. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 13. R
19. Id. at 4–5.
20. Id. at 58–67.
21. Id. at 173–266.
22. Id. at 220–52.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 190–200, 213–19.
25. Id. at 220–52.
26. Id. at 5.
27. Scott, supra note 3, at 331. R
35748-neb_93-3 Sheet No. 53 Side A      04/02/2015   08:48:02
35748-neb_93-3 Sheet No. 53 Side A      04/02/2015   08:48:02
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\93-3\NEB303.txt unknown Seq: 8  1-APR-15 16:46
2015] MEDICAL–LEGAL PARTNERSHIPS 643
care-professional audience’s unanticipated reaction to her pronounce-
ment regarding the physician’s fiduciary duty to their patients at a
conference on conflict resolution in healthcare.28  As she tells it, audi-
ence members reacted angrily, complaining about the “burdening” of
doctors with “more duties,” exclaiming that “the doctor-patient rela-
tionship is therapeutic.”29  In other words, as Professor Scott deter-
mined through greater discussion and thought both during and after
the conference, doctors saw themselves as healers and saw healing as
an obligation that was not necessarily connected to advocacy.30  The
concept of fiduciary, however, is broad enough to encompass both
roles.  As Professor Scott concludes, taking the concept of fiduciary
“seriously may unsettle our conventional views of doctors as healers
and lawyers as advocates.”31
As McCullough has described, there are three key components to
how a physician’s fiduciary obligations have been defined: “(1) [the
physician] must be in a position to know reliably the patient’s interest,
(2) should be concerned primarily with protecting and promoting the
interests of the patient, and (3) should be concerned only secondarily
with protecting and promoting the physician’s own interests.”32  The
development of these concepts has been pivotal to the physician’s un-
derstanding that her commitment to her patients renders her commit-
ment to her own interests, whether for “income, job security and
advancement, prestige, fame and power,” secondary.33  This subordi-
nation of personal interests in favor of the interests of the person be-
ing served has been articulated as an element of the “ ‘ideal’ conception
of a profession.”34
In the case of the indigent disabled claimant’s physician, her
power, and by extension her obligation, encompasses not only the
treatment of the claimant’s physical or mental ills (healing), but also
effective participation in the disability claims process itself (advocacy).
This is true for three reasons: the specific nature of the process for
obtaining disability benefits, which silences the patient’s voice in favor
of the physician’s; the fact that the process is part of a larger legal
adversarial context that presumes formalized argument and counter-
argument; and finally, the fact that, for this particular population, in-
come supports are an inseparable part of treatment.  Income supports
28. Id. at 331–32.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 333.
32. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 13, at 5 (citing L.B. MCCULLOUGH & F.A. CHERVENAK, R
ETHICS IN OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 12 (1994)).
33. Id. at 2.
34. Id. at 3 (citing Allen Buchanan, Is There a Medical Profession in the House?, in
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CLINICAL PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 105, 107 (Roy G.
Spece et al. eds., 1996)).
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for this population are a social determinant of health and therefore a
factor to be treated in order to effectively heal.35
Regarding patient voice, it is important to note that within the con-
text of the disability claims process, it is the physician who is given
the voice to provide witness to the claimant’s disability.36  While the
claimant is asked to describe her impairments, her voice is not given
the same weight as that of the physician either in the examining room
or throughout the disability claims process.37  It is the claimant’s phy-
sician who has the power to be heard when she articulates the nature
and extent of the claimant’s impairments, not the claimant.38
One can certainly argue that within the legal process for obtaining
disability benefits, perhaps it is this precise procedural requirement
that a claimant provide physician documentation of her own ailment
that is the problem, and not the physician’s failure to effectively docu-
ment the claimant’s ailment.  Lucie White, in her famous story re-
garding her client, Mrs. G, discusses a “humanist vision,” wherein
“procedural justice is a normative horizon rather than a technical
problem.”39  In other words, achieving procedural justice generally re-
quires us to expand our understanding beyond merely permitting ac-
cess to ensuring meaningful participation that allows for and
comprehends subordinated voices.  What passes for procedural jus-
tice—providing an opportunity for the subordinated to speak—fails to
account for the constructs that render “the subjectivity and speech of
35. The social determinants of health, such as substandard housing and food scar-
city, are precisely what Dr. Zuckerman realized were preventing his patients
from healing despite their compliance with his treatment recommendations.  The
problem, he realized, was the limits of his prescriptions.  Medicine alone could
not cure his patients’ ills.  In some circumstances, the toll that poor nutrition and
shelter had on his patients was so great that his prescriptions had virtually no
impact on their illness.  It was this realization that led the doctor to conclude that
social determinants, as well as physical and psychological ones, must be ad-
dressed as part of the healing process. See THE NAT’L CTR. FOR MED. LEGAL
P’SHIP, supra note 1. R
36. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a) (2014) (claimants must “furnish medical and other
evidence that we can use to reach conclusions about your medical impairment(s)”
(emphasis added)); See also id. § 404.1513(a) (“Sources who can provide evidence
to establish an impairment.  We need evidence from acceptable medical sources to
establish whether you have a medically determinable impairment(s).  Acceptable
medical sources are: (1) licensed physician . . . (2) licensed or certified psycholo-
gists . . . (3) licensed optometrists . . . .” (emphasis added)).
37. See id. § 404.1513(b)(6) (“Medical reports should include . . . [a] statement about
what you can still do despite your impairment(s) based on the acceptable medical
source’s findings on the factors under paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(5) of this
section . . . .”)
38. See id. § 404.1527(c)(2) (requires that reviewing courts “give more weight to the
opinions” of the claimants’ treating physicians).
39. Lucie White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes
on the Hearings of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990).
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socially subordinated persons as inherently inferior to the speech and
personhood of dominant groups.”40
Within the context of the current procedural processes that exist
for indigent disabled claimants, a legal definition of “objective medical
evidence of disability”—a requirement for both social security disabil-
ity benefits and most private disability income benefits41—includes
evidence provided by an outsider, a third party, a person with relevant
medical expertise who has a professional obligation to provide medical
facts and truthful medical opinion regarding a claimant’s ability to
work.42  As the physician provides these medical facts and opinion,
the facts and opinion provided by the claimant get pushed aside.  The
claimant’s descriptions, opinions, and answers to questions are re-
viewed only with respect to whether they are consistent with the phy-
sician’s statements.43  Those claimant statements that contradict the
physicians’ are discounted, deemed “not credible.”44  In this manner,
the claimant’s procedural protection is almost entirely eliminated.
How can one claim “meaningful participation” if one’s testimony is
40. Id. at 4.
41. Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 629
(1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1995)); Mala M. Rafik, Objective Evidence
in Disability Claims, 20 PRAC. LITIGATOR 31 (2009).
42. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920, 416.927 (2014).  With respect to private long-term disability
insurance, requirements differ from policy to policy.  However, many long-term
disability insurance policies require “objective evidence” of disability. See Aaron
Hotfelder, Appealing a Denial of Long-Term Disability Insurance, NOLO, http://
www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/appealing-denial-long-term-disability-insur
ance.html (last visited May 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/AC32-
WBF6; Insurance Companies, MYDISABILITYAPPEAL.COM, http://www.mydisability-
appeal.com/insurance-companies.php (last visited May 8, 2014), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/W86T-KHE4; Long-Term Disability: What Reasons are
Given by Insurance Companies to Deny a Claim?, ALLAN W. BEN, PC, http://www
.allanwbenpc.com/blog/erisa/long-term-disability-what-reasons-are-given-by-in
surance-companies-to-deny-a-claim (last visited May 8, 2014), archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/9KSN-VF6W; OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE, http://getmyltdbenefits.com/
practice-areas/objective-evidence (last visited May 8, 2014), archived at http://per
ma.unl.edu/R7KY-YYHQ.
43. See Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007) (“To determine
whether a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credi-
ble, an ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis.  First, the ALJ must determine
whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying
impairment . . . .”); see also 20 CFR § 404.1513(a) (requiring claimant to provide
evidence from “acceptable medical sources,” which include licensed physicians,
psychologists, and optometrists).
44. See Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591–92 (9th Cir. 2008)(discussing ALJ’s
decision to reject claimant’s subjective testimony of her chronic pain due to dis-
crepancies between those statements and the information contained in the re-
ports from the treating and examining physicians); see also Similia v. Astrue, 573
F.3d 503, 518 (7th Cir. 2009) (upholding ALJ’s rejection of claimant’s credibility
due to the contradictory nature of his testimony when compared to several of his
doctors’ reports).
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constantly erased, minimized, or deemed not worthy of credulity by
the testimony of the witness recognized by the justice system as the
“true” voice of the patient?
Subsuming the client’s voice into that of the physician’s requires
physicians to truly hear their patients so as to effectively communi-
cate the patient’s position rather than undermine it.  Given the physi-
cian’s power to act as the claimant’s voice, the physician has the
corresponding responsibility to ensure that her articulation is appro-
priately supportive of her disabled patient’s claims.45  Doctors who are
not legally trained but who nevertheless attempt to advocate on behalf
of their patients often end up undermining, rather than supporting,
45. Note that the term “appropriately supportive” is meant to include only those ac-
tions or words that the physician believes, in her medical judgment, to be true.
When referring to indigent disabled patients, I am referring to those patients
who the physician believes to be disabled in the colloquial sense of the term.  In
other words, I am referring to those patients who, given what the physician
knows of her patients’ past work history or education levels, as well as the pa-
tients’ physical and mental limitations, are unable to work, in the physician’s
opinion.  I am not referring to those patients who the physician does not believe
are disabled, nor am I advocating any compromise of the physician’s independent
medical judgment.  Where a physician does not believe that a patient is disabled,
her obligation is to ensure that her patient understands this, as well as the rea-
sons for that belief.  Additionally, a dialogue regarding the patient’s capabilities,
symptoms, potential treatments, and potential referrals for assistance in ad-
dressing the problems that drove the patient to believe she was eligible for disa-
bility in the first place should ensue.  In this manner, rather than simply
amplifying or drowning her patient’s voice, a physician can return the patient’s
voice to the patient by working with the patient to achieve benefits (income sup-
port or work-related) that are consistent with their collaborative assessment of
the patient’s capabilities and needs.
While honest discussions of a patient’s capabilities may seem beyond what is
required ethically, and often raise legitimate concerns that a physician has re-
garding the patient’s willingness to trust her physician, such discussions are con-
sistent with modern conceptions of medical ethics that include moral
responsibility for the patients’ rights of self-determination. See Tom L.
Beauchamp, Emerging Paradigms in Bioethics: Principles and Other Emerging
Paradigms in Bioethics, 69 Ind. L. J. 955, 958–59 (1994).  Pretending to support a
patient’s self-conception that she is disabled for fear that failure to do so will
result in a breach of trust ultimately and ironically will do more damage to the
physician/patient relationship than honest discussions and appropriate referrals
would.  This is precisely because a physician who does not believe that her pa-
tient is disabled, but fails to convey this to the patient, will complete medical
documentation requests in a manner that reflects her skepticism and, conse-
quently, benefits will be denied.  Certainly, upon receipt of the denial the physi-
cian can continue the pretense, expressing outrage on the patient’s behalf, but
this does nothing to ensure that the patient has a sustainable income, health
insurance, or any ability to comply with treatment recommendations.  Note that
Beauchamps’ discussion of a patient’s autonomy and right of self-determination
is as a contrast to or outgrowth from traditional medical ethical conceptions
which focus on patient welfare.  In the context of the low-income disabled patient,
however, interdisciplinary competence as physician responsibility is supported by
both traditional and modern conceptions.
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their patients’ claims.  Worse, doctors who don’t view their role as ad-
vocatory at all fail to understand how their “objective” reporting of a
patient’s condition will doom an application to fail.  Undermining a
patient application for disability benefits can result in serious harm to
the patient, both in terms of her welfare and her autonomy.  Conse-
quently, failing to advocate or failing to learn what effective advocacy
requires when a patient is disabled is unethical.  Ethical obligations
relating to both patient welfare and autonomy cannot be derived with-
out consideration of the adversarial context.  A physician that says, “I
must be objective, I will only report what I see and let those in author-
ity make the ultimate decision as it is not my place to determine
whether a patient is legally eligible for benefits,” fails to acknowledge
that the process for obtaining benefits is, necessarily, a process
wherein a claimant must prove disability to those who presume capa-
bility.  In other words, there is no magical, objective, unbiased decision
maker in the sky.  Decisions regarding eligibility for benefits are
made, in the first instance, by the doctors and lawyers who are paid by
the decision makers.  They are trained and paid to interpret their own
definitions of disability narrowly.  To pretend that the decision mak-
ers “know” who is “truly” disabled and who is not is to pretend that the
truth will be made apparent without benefit of the normal back-and-
forth required by our adversary system.  It is contrary to the very cor-
nerstone of our adversarial process to assume that some objective
truth can be determined without the benefit of counterargument.  Be-
cause the claimant’s physician plays a vital role in the disability
claims process, which is adversarial in nature, it is unethical for a
physician to claim that he or she has no opinion and is merely report-
ing “the medical facts.”46
Finally, because disability income benefits for the indigent dis-
abled are the sole source of income and financial support for those pa-
tients, accessing food, shelter, clothing and health care are impossible
without them.  In other words, income benefits for persons with no
other source of income or financial support are directly connected to
treatment.  If treatment is defined not only as analyzing, diagnosing,
prescribing and providing a treatment plan, but also as the actual fol-
low-up to that plan, then there is no treatment without the income to
46. As alluded to above, perhaps there is an argument that a claimant’s physician
should not have this role, that this is overly burdensome on the physician who,
after all, wants solely to treat her patient.  Certainly, many physicians believe
that the myriad requests for documentation thrust upon them by their patients
are not why they went to medical school.  Whether the role that our legal system,
built as it is on the participants’ ability to prove their claims, is unreasonable and
should be abolished, is beyond the scope of this paper.  My argument is simply a
call for recognition that our legal system, such as it is, does impose this role on
the claimant’s physician and that the ethical requirements of fulfilling this role
therefore include interdisciplinary education.
35748-neb_93-3 Sheet No. 55 Side B      04/02/2015   08:48:02
35748-neb_93-3 Sheet No. 55 Side B      04/02/2015   08:48:02
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\93-3\NEB303.txt unknown Seq: 13  1-APR-15 16:46
648 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:636
make it happen.  Even a doctor willing to visit an indigent disabled
patient at a shelter—providing her time and expertise for free—can-
not then ensure that the medicinal, nutritional, and minimum envi-
ronmental needs of her patient are met absent actually physically
providing the medicine, food, and shelter herself.  Arguably the physi-
cian’s obligation is to provide the recommendation, the plan of action,
rather than fulfill the physical need.  But where a patient’s lack of
income makes following the treatment plan an actual impossibility,
whose responsibility is it?  Put another way, where even minimal rec-
ommendations cannot be followed, what is the meaning of health care
access?  When furnishing what is necessary in terms of effective advo-
cacy will provide the income that provides that ability to pursue the
treatment plan, it is clear that advocacy for the indigent disabled is
merely an extension of the doctor’s clear obligation to provide the diag-
nosis and treatment plan.  It is not a separable task that is recom-
mended but not obligatory.
It is important to note here that despite the reluctance of some who
continue to believe that healing does not encompass advocacy, based
on my own experiences with my clients’ doctors, most doctors for the
indigent disabled intuitively understand the importance that advo-
cacy has in their patient’s lives.  The problem is a failure to under-
stand that effective advocacy is not only beyond their skill and
training but often counterintuitive to their own understanding of what
questions are being asked and why.  The failure to fully appreciate the
gaps between their own perspectives and those of the legal arena in
which their patients must fight can result in ineffective, time-consum-
ing advocacy efforts and a life-threatening (for their patient) denial of
benefits.
As stated above, there are three essential “components” to a physi-
cian’s ethical obligation as fiduciary, the first of which is compe-
tence.47  A physician who is unaware of the nature and extent of the
review facing her disabled patient’s records or how to effectively pre-
sent the evidence in support of her patient’s claim, is arguably not
competent.  Again, we are faced with the question of whether compe-
tence encompasses merely knowing which drug or treatment to pre-
scribe, or whether it includes ensuring that the prescription can be
filled.  In light of the American Medical Association’s articulation of
the physician’s obligation “to advocate for the patient’s welfare,” the
answer must be the latter, broader conception of competence.48  As
already stated, an indigent disabled patient has no source of income
47. Scott, supra note 3, at 336, 337. See MCCULLOUGH, supra note 13, at 5 (citing R
L.B. MCCULLOUGH & F.A. CHERVENAK, ETHICS IN OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY
12 (1994)).
48. AM. MED. ASS’N., CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS OPINION E-10.015 (2001), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/NFN6-M5KM.
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other than her potential disability benefits.  Therefore, a physician’s
failure to work with her patient’s attorney not only by responding to
requests but also by learning how to characterize the medical evidence
in the light most favorable to her patient is a failure to advocate for
her patient’s welfare that will result in a failure to help her patient
heal.  It is not merely an unfortunate error.  It is an ethical violation.
It is the ethical obligation to understand the importance of crossdis-
ciplinary work on behalf of indigent disabled patients that is critical to
the successful fulfillment of a physician’s advocacy and healing
obligations.49
Similarly, a lawyer’s duty to “zealously advocate” on behalf of her
client encompasses her need to ensure that she has marshaled the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to her client.  This means that
merely seeking medical records and submitting them is not sufficient.
As will be discussed in more detail below, medical records are kept by
the physician for the physician.  They are often, at best, unhelpful
with regard to the legal question of whether the client is disabled and
at worst they unintentionally undermine the client’s application.  It is
the lawyer’s job to anticipate and address these issues through active
interdisciplinary involvement with her client’s doctor.
Interestingly, most of the literature regarding the discussion of a
lawyer’s obligation of zealousness is about discomfort with overzeal-
ous lawyers who take this obligation too far.  The literature, with a
few notable exceptions,50 is silent regarding resource limitations and
consequent underzealous lawyering.  Nevertheless, it is clear, as al-
ready stated, that there is no written exemption for the poverty law-
yer.51  Zealousness is justified in the name of adversary advocacy.
49. Trudy Lieberman, This Doctor Treats Poverty Like a Disease, CTR. FOR ADVANC-
ING HEALTH (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.cfah.org/blog/2013/this-doctor-treats-pov
erty-like-a-disease, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/Q5B-GC8Z.  In characteriz-
ing poverty in this manner, Dr. Bloch suggests that “treating” lack of income sup-
ports as part of the disease or health condition suffered by the patient is integral
to providing treatment.  Therefore, he “prescribes” financial plans for his patients
such as following up on tax refunds or applying for social security benefits and
subsidies that could assist his patients with food or medicine.  What I argue here
is not only that providing such “prescriptions” should be a regular part of the
practice for any doctor of low-income disabled patients but that the prescriptions
need to be completed with the care that comes from interdisciplinary learning
and training, since these prescriptions cannot be filled by mere delivery to a
pharmacy.  They can only be filled after an adjudicator has been legally per-
suaded of the patient’s eligibility for the prescription.
50. For the exceptions see Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 10; Jacobs, supra note 10; R
Tremblay, supra note 11. R
51. See Jacobs, supra note 10, at 101 (citing Tremblay, supra note 11, at 1136). See R
also ABA COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, STANDARDS FOR THE
PROVISION OF CIVIL LEGAL AID ii–iii (2006) (These Standards are presented as
aspirational guidelines . . . .  The Standards do not create any mandatory require-
ments[,] . . . do not expand, add or change any ethical responsibilities with which
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The problem, however, is deciding what constitutes zealous advocacy
and how it is to be determined.
Zealousness is not defined by the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility.52  Michelle Jacobs raises, as an example of the vagueness
of the term, the question of whether going to an indigent client’s home
for an interview is required when the client is unable to present her-
self to the lawyer’s office but the lawyer believes that an in-person
interview would be more effective for the representation.53
Where a client can pay for a home visit, the question of whether it
is ethically required to do so in the above-described circumstance is
not reached.  Certainly, the paid lawyer who engages in a home visit is
as unavailable to her other clients while engaged in the home visit as
a poverty lawyer would be.  However, where payment replaces the in-
quiry regarding zealousness, lawyers with resources can simply re-
solve any potential conflicts.  A lawyer with resources can  have
another lawyer, most likely from within her own office, take over the
matter that would otherwise be sacrificed while the lawyer went on
the home visit.  She can do so, in part, because she can charge the
client that needs the home visit for her time.54
As poverty lawyers don’t have associates to assign things to, every
home visit on behalf of one client means the inability to serve the im-
a legal aid provider or practitioner must comply[,] and all lawyers are bound by
the ethical rules that apply in the jurisdiction in which they practice.”).  Note, as
well, that in the introduction to the ABA Standards, beneath the heading “Under-
lying Principles of the Standards” is the following: “Zealous representation of cli-
ent interests.  All lawyers should pursue their clients’ interests with zeal
consistent with the law and applicable standards of professional conduct.” Id. at
iv.
52. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-2 (1980) (stating that “[t]he bounds
of the law in a given case are often difficult to ascertain” and citing Justice
Holmes in Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395–96 (1930) (“[T]he
very meaning of a line in the law is that you intentionally may go as close to it as
you can if you do not pass it. . . .  It is a matter of proximity and degree as to
which minds will differ . . . .”)).
53. Jacobs, supra note 10, at 101.
54. It should be noted that lawyers who charge disabled clients extra monies for ser-
vices rendered specifically because of the client’s disability could run afoul of the
Americans with Disabilities Act. See 28 C.F.R § 36 (1991) (governing obligations
of public service providers in rendering their services accessible and ensuring
communication abilities of these services providers to all users).  Assuming, how-
ever, that a wealthy disabled client—or simply a wealthy client who prefers the
convenience of a home visit—can pay for a home visit and is given the option of
doing so, a lawyer for such a client can choose to do so without needing to ask
oneself whether such a visit is ethically necessary for the representation.  Once
the home visit is characterized as a necessity by the indigent client—or rather
the indigent client makes a claim that she is unable to travel—the lawyer who
has other indigent clients to attend to is now faced with determining whether a
home visit is a legal necessity, a requirement for zealous and effective
representation.
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mediate needs of one or more other clients.  If zealousness requires the
lawyer in Ms. Jacobs’s hypothetical to visit her client, then what be-
comes of the lawyer’s ethical obligations towards the second client who
the lawyer will not be able to assist the afternoon of the home visit
because the lawyer is busy assisting the first client?  Because the pov-
erty lawyer does not have the ability to simply assign another associ-
ate to the second client, does the poverty lawyer end up convincing
herself that zealousness doesn’t require the home visit and therefore
decide simply to conduct the interview over the phone?  And whether
or not this is the outcome, does the fact that the second client’s needs
are being considered by the poverty lawyer turn the question of what
zealousness requires into a question that is improperly answered in
part by expediency, creating a conflict of interest between two other-
wise wholly unconflicting client matters?
Paul Tremblay addresses these concerns in directly suggesting
that, of course, the situation in legal services offices or in any limited
resource office creates a conflict between clients.55  Time is finite and
cannot be “grown” through the addition of another lawyer to add her
time to the pool of resources to be spent on clients.  Therefore, time
spent on one client matter necessarily detracts from time with an-
other.56  These arguments were raised by Tremblay largely in direct
response to the seminal article on legal-services lawyering by Gary
Bellow and Jeanne Kettleson, who argued vociferously that the only
ethical way to limit legal services to the poor is to limit the number of
persons served but not the actual service provided.57  While Tremblay
notes that more recent conversations with Bellow and Kettleson re-
veal that their stance has evolved in recognition of the costs and bene-
fits of high-volume practice, he nevertheless acknowledges that their
original position is one that, at the time of his writing, continued as
the majority viewpoint of the profession.58  For this reason, as he ex-
plains, it is this viewpoint that he challenges.59
Tremblay argues primarily that “conventional notions of informed
consent and zeal” are different in the legal-services context than they
are in the private lawyering context.60  Because of a lack of resources,
Tremblay argues, a poverty lawyer must provide less client-centered
and more lawyer-directed representation than the private lawyer is
able to provide.61  By way of example he suggests that poverty lawyers
may simply not be able to afford to bring to trial a case where a good
55. Tremblay, supra note 11. R
56. Id.
57. Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 10. R
58. Tremblay, supra note 11, at 1102 n.5. R
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1102.
61. Id. at 1102–03.
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settlement offer is made, despite a client’s insistence that she wants
her “day in court.”62  Similarly, experts may not be called and discov-
ery may be minimal, all because the lawyer’s office cannot afford to
provide these services (and the clients cannot afford to pay for them)
rather than because the client agrees that these things are
unnecessary.63
While Tremblay’s arguments seem reasonable and logical, they fail
to account for the realities of any law office, even one that is well-
resourced, and the constraints placed on the lawyer by the ethical
rules.  It is certainly possible that a lawyer who can freely charge her
client for the privilege of having her day in court (if that is what the
client wants to do) is able to reject a good settlement offer and, while
tending to her client’s trial, put another associate on her other client
matters.  However, whether that lawyer will do so when faced with a
good settlement offer depends very much on the lawyer’s assessment
of the merits of a trial.64  If the lawyer can present several valid rea-
sons for not going to trial, she is obligated to do so.65  If the client
persists in desiring to go to trial, the lawyer is still obligated to con-
sider whether the client’s goals are, as a threshold matter, meritorious
and not frivolous.66  If the assessment is that going to trial is ethically
permissible, the lawyer can and should still counsel the client against
this plan if the lawyer believes that the client will fare better by ac-
cepting the settlement offer.67  Finally, if, after all of this, the client
remains steadfast in her desire to go to trial, the lawyer can still (pro-
vided it is not the eve of trial and would not unduly prejudice the
client) withdraw, refer the client to another lawyer, or both.68  Ulti-
mately, even for a wealthy client, the lawyer who is given a good set-
tlement offer will not go to trial unless she believes that doing so
would advance the client’s interests.  The fact that the lawyer for the
wealthy client will get paid to go to trial certainly makes it easier for
the lawyer to do so but it does not make the decision less lawyer di-
rected.  Lawyers for wealthy clients have more time than poverty law-
yers but not an infinite amount.  They therefore have the same need to
make cost-effective decisions.
The same arguments can be made when considering which wit-
nesses to call or what discovery to be made.  Certainly a poor client is
severely constrained by her lack of a litigation budget.  However, a
lawyer for a wealthy client who calls and deposes unnecessary wit-
62. Id. at 1123.
63. Id. at 1118.
64. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-5, 7-7, 7-8, DR 7-101 (1980).
65. Id. EC 7-8, DR 7-101.
66. Id. EC 7-5, DR 7-101.
67. Id.
68. Id. EC 7-8, DR 7-101.
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nesses engages in endless and frivolous discovery and otherwise con-
ducts a “no holds barred” approach to a client matter is more likely to
be sanctioned than victorious.69  At a minimum, a wealthy client is
likely to realize at some point that the enormous litigation expenses
do not seem justified by the result and could therefore refuse to pay,
terminate the relationship with the lawyer or law firm, or both.
Again, as with the decision whether to accept an offer or go to trial,
the decisions regarding litigation-related expenses are expected, by
both the courts and the clients, to be cost-effectively made.  In addi-
tion, the decision about whether a particular expense is necessary to
advance the client’s interests is generally one to be made by the law-
yer or with the lawyer’s counsel.  Even wealthy clients cannot insist
that a particular person be deposed or hired as an expert if doing so, in
the lawyer’s assessment, would not advance the client’s interests.70
Of course there can be a wide gap between minimally necessary
and frivolous.  This is not to suggest that there are not a great deal of
advantages that a wealthy client has in litigation that a poor client
simply does not.  However, viewing the ethical rules as a floor, rather
than a ceiling, it is not fair to suggest, as Tremblay does, that lawyers
for poor people simply are not able to be as client centered as lawyers
for wealthy people because their time as well as money resources are
limited.  It is possible, as is proven by legal-services attorneys across
the country every day, to provide superb, client-centered lawyering on
behalf of multiple poor clients.  The lawyers who do this are able to do
so in part by working long hours (some longer than their private law-
yer counterparts), literally “growing” their time resource by being will-
ing to conduct business at all hours, and in part by being experts at
conducting low-cost but high-yield litigation.
While Tremblay’s bleak description of the rationing of legal ser-
vices that legal-services lawyers are forced to provide due to a lack of
resources is not entirely incorrect, the fault lies with suggesting that
the real limitations that resources impose make comparison to pri-
vate-practice professionalism impossible.  To be sure, greater
resourced law firm clients have more choices.  But the choices are not
limitless nor are the resources of the law firms.  Where funding con-
strains the choices of legal-services attorneys, the demand for cost-
effective results, the constraints of market-place competition, the per-
sonal goals of the law firm managing partners and of the law firm
lawyers themselves, as well as the professional rules of conduct all
place boundaries on the practice of law for any lawyer and create simi-
lar kinds of conflicts for resources among private clients.  The differ-
ence is a matter of degree rather than of kind.  Further, the
69. Id. EC 7-4, 7-5, 7-9, 7-10, DR 7-101 .
70. Id. EC 7-7, 7-8, 7-9, DR 7-101; see E. Wayne Thode, The Ethical Standard of the
Advocate, 39 TEX. L. REV. 575, 582 (1961).
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differences, because they are a matter of degree, result in practices on
the legal-services side that compensate for their client’s resource
constraints.
Legal-services lawyers, as already stated, are experts at con-
ducting low-cost but high-yield litigation.  In fact, arguably, it is pre-
cisely because of this expertise, resulting in an extremely high success
rate on behalf of their impoverished clients, that legal services have
come under attack politically.71  Legal-services lawyers cost govern-
ment and business substantial amounts—not in funding but in the
development of legal entitlements from children’s SSI to due process
hearings for welfare benefits to due process rights for juveniles.  These
entitlements exist because of the lawsuits that nonprofit legal-services
offices have brought on behalf of their clients and litigated and won or
settled favorably.72  Consequently, every year since 1995 (ironically
five years after Tremblay’s article was published) Congress has voted
to reduce legal-services funding or keep it well below prior funding-
year highs, and has even imposed specific restrictions on the work
that those offices can do, while need and eligibility for legal services
has increased.73  The legal-services resource landscape is therefore far
more dire and restricted than it was when Tremblay wrote.  And yet,
legal-services lawyers continue to find ways to provide fully zealous
representation to their clients and, as this Article argues, must con-
tinue to do so.
The fundamental problem with conceding that lack of resources
necessarily constrains poverty lawyering to the point of necessitating
ethical exceptions is of course the quality of justice that results from
71. Kat Aaron, The GOP Plot to Destroy Legal Aid: Behind the Conservative Effort to
Gut a Crucial Anti-Poverty Lifeline, MOTHER JONES, Feb. 14, 2011, http://www
.motherjones.com/politics/2011/02/gop-slashes-legal-aid-funds, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/ZEM3-LWHG.
72. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Aid in the United States: The Professionalization
and Politicization of Legal Services in the 1980’s, 22 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 29,
42–43 (1984). See also Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990) (establishing dis-
abled children’s right to SSDI and brought by Philadelphia Community Legal
Services, Inc.); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that procedural
due process requires that pretermination evidentiary hearing be held when pub-
lic assistance payments to welfare recipients are discontinued and brought by
Mobilization for Youth (MFY) Legal Unit, a legal aid program funded by the Of-
fice of Economic Opportunity); Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding
that a juvenile has right to notice of charges, to counsel, to confrontation and
cross-examination of witnesses, and to privilege against self-incrimination and
brought by the nonprofit American Civil Liberties Union).
73. CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34016, LEGAL SERVICES
CORPORATION: BACKGROUND AND FUNDING 3, 5 (2013) (discussing restrictions on
the work legal services organizations do and discussing the legal need not being
met by legal services organizations); Funding History, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http:/
/www.lsc.gov/congress/funding/funding-history (last viewed Apr. 15, 2014),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/S29Z-CRPJ.
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such a concession.  Lawyers and clients, just like doctors and patients,
have a fiduciary relationship.  The ethical rules that govern lawyer
behavior form the boundary of obligations that a lawyer owes to her
client and to the public.  They are minimums, designed to redress the
imbalance, in knowledge and expertise (and consequently power) be-
tween lawyer and client.  The relationship between a poor client’s law-
yer and her client is not less imbalanced than the relationship
between a wealthy client’s lawyer and her client.  If anything, the im-
balance is greater between the impoverished client, who is dis-
empowered precisely because of her poverty as well as her lack of legal
expertise, and her lawyer.  The potential for abuse of the fiduciary re-
lationship is therefore greater as is, consequently, the need for insis-
tence on application of all of the ethical rules, without exception.  And
again, to argue, as Tremblay does, that expectations of zealousness
and client-centered lawyering for legal-services lawyers are simply
unrealistic given the conflicts of interest between clients that limited
resources creates, fails to account for the effective management of
those conflicts that both public-sector lawyers and private attorneys
are forced to engage in every day.74  Accepting that differences be-
74. That private lawyers manage these conflicts as well can be clearly seen by impli-
cation in a conversation between author and attorney Bryan Garner and U.S.
Supreme Court Chief Justice Roberts regarding this exact question: how to bal-
ance costs with quality.  Chief Justice Roberts emphatically states that ulti-
mately, because of the lawyer’s professional obligations and her reputation as a
professional, quality cannot be sacrificed.  The discussion does not revolve around
poverty lawyers but rather, lawyering as a general matter. See Judges, Lawyers,
and Writers on Writing, LAWPROSE, https://www.lawprose.org/interviews/judges-
lawyers-writers-on-writing.php?vid=roberts_balance&vidtitle=Hon._John_Rob
erts_On_Balancing_Quality_and_Cost (last visited 4/3/2014), archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/GHY3-257S.
Interestingly, Chief Justice Roberts emphasizes professionalism rather than
ethical obligations, which is something that Michelle Jacobs discusses in analyz-
ing the ethical dilemma that limited resources causes for poverty lawyers. See
Jacobs, supra note 10, at 107–08.  Jacobs cites the work of JACK SAMMONS, LAW- R
YER PROFESSIONALISM 63 (1988), for an alternative definition of professionalism
as “a way for people to participate in a meaningful fashion in the resolution of
their social disputes,” and suggests that employment of this definition would re-
sult in greater zealous advocacy on the part of legal services lawyers. Id. at 111.
While I do not disagree that this definition is helpful to our understanding of
professional obligations, I do not see it as changing or enhancing the poverty law-
yer’s ability to fulfill her ethical obligations.  Those obligations exist regardless of
how we define the term professional.  An attorney providing minimally adequate
services is only sufficiently zealous if in providing those services she has suc-
ceeded in meeting her client’s goals for the representation.  If she cannot meet
her client’s goals then the services she has provided are not only insufficiently
zealous but also not even minimally adequate.  The difficulty, as Ms. Jacobs
pointed out in the beginning of her article, comes back to the lack of definition for
zealous.  While I believe most would instinctively agree that minimally adequate
does not equal zealous the difficulty is in determining precisely where the differ-
ence lies.  For my purposes, however, this difference does not have to be fully
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tween private- and public-sector lawyers is one of degree rather than
kind reveals that these conflicts exist on the private side as well.  The
fact that legal-services lawyers must prioritize client matters is not
different in the private sector, it simply occurs more often in the public
sector.
Additionally, to the extent that the resource constraints truly do
make it impossible in particular individual cases for the poverty law-
yer to render sufficiently zealous representation, the responsibility for
that failure stems from, as already stated, the lack of resources, not
the attorney.  Consequently the remedy should involve looking at
those that provide the insufficient resources, not at rendering the at-
torney’s professional obligations less important or unenforceable.  In
other words, where there is an ethical violation, the solution cannot be
to ignore or abandon the ethical rule that was violated, even where the
attorney’s violation was through no fault of her own.
Finally, as Tremblay himself ultimately points out, not every
choice is a kind of zero sum game.75  For example, a poverty lawyer
who chooses to do more in-depth research regarding an issue about
which she has some knowledge and therefore did not necessarily have
to do, can now use whatever she has found to benefit future clients
whose matters involve the same legal issues.76  Similarly, a poverty
lawyer who, after consultation with a client, turns down a settlement
offer and proceeds to trial, will, as a result of trying that case, have the
benefit of her experience in trying the case.77  This will render her
future litigation-related representation more effective for clients
defined before we can determine that representation of an indigent disabled per-
son in the disability income context without the benefit of an interdisciplinary
partnership is neither minimally adequate nor sufficiently zealous to withstand
ethical challenge precisely because of the adversary’s use of interdisciplinary
partnerships to determine and then defend against the claim.
75. See Tremblay, supra note 11, at 1120–22 (discussing the need for legal services R
lawyers, due to resource constraints, to make decisions about the most efficient
ways to allocate those resources).  Resources such as attorney time are allocated
not only based on what allocation will ensure success of an individual client’s case
but also based on what allocation will most likely benefit all impoverished clients
and potential clients.  Tremblay is here recognizing that the legal-services corpo-
ration itself, which funds legal services across the country, was created as part of
President Johnson’s “War on Poverty” effort.  As a result, legal services are not
only about the provision of individual representation but also about the provision
of individual representation in a manner that is most likely to aid the indigent, as
a group, in climbing out of poverty.  This was all well and good in the abstract but
in reality potentially creates a conflict between an individual client’s legal needs
and the legal needs of her community who were also potential clients. See His-
tory: The Founding of LSC, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/about/what-
is-lsc/history (last visited Nov. 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/P6AH-
ZKXE.
76. See Tremblay, supra note 11 at 1120-22.
77. Id.
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whose cases involve the same litigation forum or whose cases are
before the same judge.78
Tremblay argues that, in addition to limiting what cases to take in
a poverty practice, the issue of whether to undertake a particular ac-
tion in a case should be determined, in part, by whether the contem-
plated action will have beneficial impacts or ramifications for the
community that is being served by the poverty law practice.79  In
other words, as he proposes it, legal-services lawyers should be “gov-
erned within professional ethics contexts by a vision that explicitly
includes community norms.”80
Including community norms is a way in which Tremblay envisions
resolving some of the conflict of interest dilemmas that poverty law-
yers face due to resource constraints.81  By way of example, Tremblay
discusses a common dilemma faced by legal-services housing law-
yers.82  These lawyers often find themselves representing tenants ac-
cused of crimes and facing eviction from public housing as a result,
while most of the other tenants at the housing project where that ten-
ant/client lives (many of whom may also be clients) feel that it would
be beneficial to evict all criminally involved tenants.83  Taking the
conflict even further, Tremblay also points out that the same lawyer
undertaking representation of the criminally charged tenant may also
represent clients who are on public housing waiting lists and in des-
perate need of housing that cannot be obtained as long as all public
housing units remain occupied.84
Whether to devote lawyer resources to assisting the criminally
charged tenant with remaining in public housing rather than, for ex-
ample, assisting her in finding alternate housing or combatting the
criminal charges is a question that can be ethically resolved, suggests
Tremblay, by considering the community’s concerns as well as the cli-
ent’s.85  In this manner, taking the latter course of action rather than
the former would be ethically sound.86  The client would not be aban-
doned and the assistance provided would be zealous, but the goals of
the zealous representation would not be determined solely by the cli-
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1130.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1131.
82. Id. at 1126–28.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 1130, 1134, 1139-40 (advocating that legal services lawyers be governed
within professional ethics context that takes into account the interests of the
community these lawyers serve, balanced along with the interests of the individ-
ual client).
86. See id.
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ent without regard to the community in which the client lives and the
lawyer practices.87
The problem with this proposal, however, is that Tremblay is
merely switching one ethical problem for another.  If the client’s clear
goals are to remain in public housing and there is a legally defensible
way to argue that she should be able to do this, ignoring these goals
because of community concerns presents a problem of divided loyalty
that is not permissible.88  Certainly, it is ethical to counsel your client
about many considerations, including those of the community in
which she lives, but if, after counseling, the client persists in seeking
the vindication of her right to remain in public housing, she has the
right to an attorney who will assist her, zealously, in obtaining this
goal.  That poor clients’ everyday choices are severely constrained by
their poverty—even to the point in many instances of removing choice
altogether—is not a reason to superimpose further limitations on
their already limited options by requiring indigent clients to put their
individual needs aside in favor of the community’s.  Our system of jus-
tice is built around the belief that individual rights, not community,
government, or privately held group rights are paramount.  That pov-
erty makes enforcement of those rights more difficult is unquestiona-
ble.  But declaring that poor persons simply cannot expect to have
their rights enforced does not ease this difficulty, it merely pretends
that the difficulty is not worthy of consideration.
So where does this bring us in terms of the lawyer’s ethical obliga-
tions toward the indigent disabled client?  Even if one is not per-
suaded that zealous representation on behalf of indigent clients is a
realistic standard and believes that Tremblay’s proposed compromise
involving community is closer to the mark, the particular advocacy
tool that I am proposing meets both standards.  A medical–legal part-
nership is one that expands the capacity of both the law office and
medical office to serve the community as it enhances the quality of
legal and medical services provided.  The professional’s competence
and resulting ability to handle future client/patient needs with greater
efficiency as well as more effectively is expanded a great deal.  The
context of the dispute makes the formation of medical–legal partner-
ships more than a great idea, however.  As discussed in greater detail
below, the adversaries in a disability-benefit matter utilize medi-
cal–legal partnerships to support their position.  Therefore, effectively
representing a disabled claimant in this context renders the employ-
ment of a medical–legal partnership on the claimant’s behalf an ethi-
cal necessity.
87. See id.
88. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.15 (1983) (“Loyalty and independent judg-
ment are essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to a client.”).
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I started the discussion of the lawyer’s ethical obligation of zeal-
ousness by acknowledging that the rules do not make it clear how that
term is defined.  However, it is clear that if a particular advocacy tool,
such as the formation of an interdisciplinary partnership, is not used
and this particular decision to forgo use of that tool results in a devas-
tating loss for the client, it is questionable whether the lawyer fulfilled
her ethical obligations.
III. THE MEDICAL–LEGAL GAP: HISTORY OF DISABILITY
CLAIMS ADJUDICATION
I referred earlier to the importance of the legal context in deter-
mining the ethical underpinning of the obligation to form interdiscipli-
nary partnerships on behalf of the indigent disabled.89  Disability
claims are made within an adversarial system that is meant to deliver
fair adjudications based on the premise that each party has the oppor-
tunity to present evidence in support of the claims being made.  While
the indigent disabled have the opportunity to submit their medical
records for review just like any other claimant, the way in which this
evidence became insufficient is starkly demonstrated in the evolution
of claims decisions.
The goal of the Social Security Disability Income program is to pro-
vide income support to disabled workers;90 however, ensuring that so-
cial security monies only go to truly disabled claimants is an implied
foundational part of this goal.  As claims have steadily increased,91
along with negative press attention,92 Social Security’s attempts to
ensure accurate and consistent results have driven both regulatory
amendments and court decisions.93  As claim payments have in-
creased,94 the need to ensure on-going profitability as well as accuracy
and consistency has motivated the private sector to amend their policy
89. Supra Part II.
90. Benefits for People with Disabilities, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/disa-
bility (last visited May 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/VP4V-K6MZ.
91. Selected Data from Social Security’s Disability Program, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://
www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/dibStat.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2014), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/WQG2-HS9B.
92. House Probe Cries Foul on Social Security Disability Claims, CBSNEWS.COM
(June 24, 2013, 4:45 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/house-probe-cries-foul-
on-social-security-disability-claims/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/J2KU-
APWL.
93. See Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 112–19 (1984) (citing legislative history to hold
that Congress has made clear that it rejects mandatory deadlines, which would
expedite disputed SSA claims adjudications, to ensure that quality and uniform-
ity in adjudicatory decision-making are maintained).
94. Long Term Disability Claim Payments Increase while the Number of Covered
Workers Rises, PR NEWSWIRE, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/long-
term-disability-claim-payments-increase-while-the-number-of-covered-workers-
rises-211974611.html (last visited May 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl
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language and the public sector to create legislation and interpret that
policy language narrowly.95  It is this need for accuracy and consis-
tency that exists in both the public and private sectors that has driven
.edu/68P8-USTU (pointing to a multi-year upward trend despite a slight decrease
in 2012).
95. The rationale for the wide variation in defining disability and its subsequent nar-
rowing over time on the private disability insurance side is hard to find or nonex-
istent because of the protections provided to private insurers in disclosing such
information.  For example, a model regulation from the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners, labeled, rather appropriately, the Corporate Govern-
ance Annual Disclosure Act, provides for the “confidential treatment of the corpo-
rate governance annual disclosure and related information that will contain
confidential and sensitive information related to an insurer or insurance group’s
internal operations and proprietary and trade secret information which, if made
public, could potentially cause the insurer or insurance group competitive harm
or disadvantage.”  Corporate Governance Annual Disclosure Model Act, NAT’L
ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_isftf_corp_
governance_140331_corporate_governance_model_act.pdf (last visited Nov. 3,
2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/93V4-BSXG.
Thus, similar acts adopted by the states may provide an explanation for the
lack of available information regarding private insurance policies and procedures
surrounding disability claims administration. What is publicly known is that pri-
vate disability insurance is a for-profit industry, and, as a general matter, there
is regulation of the industry meant to ensure that insurance contracts entered
into are fairly enforced, that there has been a relatively steady increase in
claims—either made or paid—over the last several decades and that during this
same time period the industry has presented an ever-narrowing definition of dis-
ability. See Ashlea Ebling, Disability Insurance: The Overlooked Employee Bene-
fit, FORBES, June 19, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2014/06/19/
disability-insurance-the-overlooked-employee-benefit/, archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/9TVT-B5MK (discussing 2014 annual disability claims report by the
COUNCIL FOR DISABILITY AWARENESS, a group which represents and collects
claims data from 19 private insurance companies, highlighting a trend of increas-
ing disability claims payments for private insurance providers); see also Izabela
Z. Schultz, Impairment and Occupational Disability in Research and Practice, in
HANDBOOK OF COMPLEX OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY CLAIMS: EARLY RISK IDENTIFI-
CATION, INTERVENTION, AND PREVENTIONS 27 (Izabela Z. Schultz & Robert J.
Gathcel eds., 2006) (“Disability compensation systems, however, including work-
ers compensation and long term disability insurance companies, have historically
preferred more narrow and specifically functionally focused definitions . . . to
make compensability objectively verifiable and financially viable for the institu-
tions granting disability status . . . .”).  Given these facts, it is not unreasonable to
infer that the motivation for the narrowing of the disability definitions has been
to ensure profitability as well as accuracy and consistency in determining
eligibility.
As for the public side of disability definitions, see Third in a Hearing Series on
Securing the Future of the Social Security Disability Insurance Program: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. of the H. Comm. Of Ways & Means, 112th Cong.
6–41 (2012) (Statement of Michael J. Astrue, Comm’r of the Social Security Ad-
ministration), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/622A-JGPG (describing the legis-
lative history of narrowing and restricting the definition of “disability” in the
Social Security program over the years  due to increases in claims for benefits).
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the above-mentioned evolution in claims decisions and, consequently,
claims-defense strategies.96
A. The Rise and Fall of the Treating Physician Rule
In 1962 the Fourth Circuit, in Underwood v. Ribicoff,97 provided
an early iteration of what would later come to be known as “the treat-
ing physician rule” in the social security disability income benefit con-
text.  The court provided a template for later attempts to legally
organize the medical evidence presented by claimants seeking social
security disability benefits.
In Underwood, the claimant’s treating physician provided evidence
of several serious medical conditions and his opinion that these pre-
vented the claimant from working.98  The claimant was then sent to
two Social Security consultative examiners who provided their own re-
ports regarding the claimant’s condition.99  The consultative examin-
ers’ reports only differed from the treating physician’s with regard to
the severity of the claimant’s ailments, not with regard to their exis-
tence.100  The objective medical facts, according to the court, there-
fore, supported a finding that the claimant was medically impaired.101
Whether the impairment was sufficiently severe to prevent the claim-
ant from engaging in substantial gainful activity102 was a matter of
subjective evidence.103  Ruling in favor of the claimant, the court
stated, “[c]onsideration here should be given to the fact that Howard
96. Utilizing unconventional strategies to collect evidence and dispute a disability
claimant’s petition for benefits, such as video surveillance of an individual per-
forming everyday activities, can provide convincing arguments for denying bene-
fits. See Finley v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 400 Fed. Appx. 198, 199–201 (9th
Cir. 2010) (discrediting claimant Finley’s testimony of disability due to video sur-
veillance of the claimant doing yard work and household chores); see also Robert
R. Pohls, Litigating Disability Insurance Claims Involving Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder: Defense Strategies and Techniques, JDSUPRA, http://documents.jdsupra
.com/69c3e704-7bbe-4751-84c2-caa3d35ec94a.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2014),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/K8G8-HQSB (discussing the use of videotape
surveillance to solicit damaging testimony of the absence or presence of diagnos-
tic criteria).
97. 298 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1962).
98. Id. at 852.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 852–53.
101. Id.
102. “Substantial gainful activity” (“SGA”) is a terms of art, defined in the Social Se-
curity Act and regulations as
work activity that is both substantial and gainful[.] . . .  Substantial
work activity is work activity that involves doing significant physical or
mental activities. . . .  Gainful work activity is work activity that you do
for pay or profit.  Work activity is gainful if it is the kind of work usually
done for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1572 (2014).
103. Underwood, 298 F.2d at 852.
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was Claimant’s treating physician, whereas Reeves saw him only once
for a routine examination.”104  It was clear with this decision that
treating physicians needed to ensure that they could provide sufficient
evidence of severity, not simply of impairment.  However, assuming
that they did so, with this decision, at least, such evidence would be
given more weight than contrary evidence provided by a government
physician who had minimal contact with the claimant.
In addition to severity of symptoms, another challenge giving rise
to battles between treating and government physician evidence were
those diseases, recognized as early as 1967 by the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals,105 whose diagnoses rested on purely subjective symptoms.
In considering evidence regarding a psychiatric impairment, the court
in Branham v. Gardner stated unequivocally that “purely subjective
symptoms may sustain a finding of disability.”106  But in getting to
this point, the court quite tellingly states,
It used to be that, unless impairment or disabilities could be substantiated by
objective symptoms, they were not considered, as, in any way, established.
“But modern medicine is neither so scientific nor so helpless today that it ei-
ther does, or must, evaluate only objective factors.”107
The court both acknowledged that past practices were based solely on
objective evidence and that there had been an evolution that led to the
understanding that “modern medicine” includes consideration of both
objective and subjective factors.  From here, it is easy to see how So-
cial Security’s desire for consistency and accuracy was truly
challenged.
Over the next thirty years, it became clear that differences in the
severity of impairments as well as the existence of impairments,
proven through subjective testimony and medical opinion, would be
the battleground in disability determinations.  The circuit courts, to
varying degrees and in slightly different forms, articulated the need to
give increased deference to the evidence provided by treating physi-
cians.108  However, while there appeared to be relative consensus
among the circuit courts that some kind of deference should be pro-
104. Id. at 853.
105. Branham v. Gardner, 383 F.2d 614 (6th Cir. 1967).
106. Branham, 383 F.2d at 618 (citations omitted).
107. Id. (quoting Hayes v. Celebrezze, 311 F.2d 648, 654 (5th Cir. 1963) (“[T]he statute
does not require that disability or its cause be substantiated objectively.”)).
108. Rachel Schneider, A Role for the Courts: Treating Physician Evidence in Social
Security Disability Determinations, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 391, 396
(1996). See also Barbara A. Sheehy, An Analysis of the Honorable Richard A.
Posner’s Social Security Law, 7 CONN. INS. L. J. 103, 127–28 (2001) (“the [treating
physician rule] is a ‘judicially created presumption designed to aid disabled
Americans in proving disability to the SSA’ (quoting George Szary, Note, The
Treating Physician Rule: Morgan Presumption in Social Security Disability In-
surance and Supplemental Security Income Cases, 17 N.Y.U. L. REV. & SOC.
CHANGE 303, 304 (1989–1990)).
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vided, precisely how much and when differed.109  Therefore, the Social
Security Administration’s (SSA) ability to comply with a consistent
standard across the circuits was difficult if not impossible.110  For
these reasons, as well as reasons related to SSA’s on-going effort to
improve the efficiency, consistency, and accuracy of disability determi-
nations in the Social Security context, SSA promulgated regulations
that codified a treating physician rule in 1991.111
This rule, while clearly articulating a preference for treating physi-
cian evidence (and therefore opinion), simultaneously proscribed this
preference with limitations.  As stated in a 1999 Second Circuit case,
“[a] treating physician’s statement that the claimant is disabled can-
not itself be determinative.”112  In other words, what had long been
gaining momentum in several circuits as a simple evidentiary prefer-
ence for treating physician evidence became yet another complicated
regulation that contained several subparts and caveats,113 making it
somewhat less than the simple, early admonition that “considera-
tion . . . should be given to the . . . treating physician.”114
Meanwhile, on the private side, disability claims were litigated in
federal courts after the 1974 enactment of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA).115  The definitions of disability in those
cases are governed by insurance contracts, not the federal statute.
Nevertheless, in those cases, disability claimants—faced with similar
conflicts between their own doctors and industry doctors—began to ar-
gue that a treating physician rule, analogous to Social Security’s,
should be imported into the consideration of these private claims.116
In Black & Decker v. Nord,117 the Supreme Court considered, but
dismissed, this argument stating, “if a consultant engaged by a plan
may have an ‘incentive’ to make a finding of ‘not disabled,’ so a treat-
ing physician, in a close case, may favor a finding of ‘disabled.’”118
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519h (2014).
112. Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Sheehy, supra note 108, R
at 132 (citing Posner’s skepticism of treating physician evidence in Cummins v.
Schweiker, 670 F.2d 81, 84 (7th Cir. 1982), and then characterizing the 1991
amendments as “essentially [codifying] Judge Posner’s skepticism of treating
physician evidence”).
113. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (2014) (dividing “Evaluating opinion evidence” into five
subsections and dividing subsection (c) of that section, “How we weigh medical
opinions,” into six sub-sections, one of which contains two further subsections
describing in great detail the factors to be considered regarding the treatment
relationship between the claimant and the medical opinion provider).
114. Underwood v. Ribicoff, 298 F.2d 850, 853 (4th Cir. 1962).
115. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
116. See, e.g., Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 829 (2003).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 832; see also Roy F. Harmon, III & A.G. Harmon, Weighing Medical Judg-
ments: Explaining Evidentiary Preferences for Treating Physician Opinions in
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The statement, made twelve years after passage of the 1991 rule by
the SSA, echoes the much earlier statement by Judge Posner that “as
[the claimant’s] personal physician he might have been leaning over
backwards to support the application for disability benefits” and that
for this reason the opinion of personal physicians should not be given
controlling weight.119
While the Court in Nord additionally stated the SSA rule could not
be judicially imported into the federal law and therefore was not appli-
cable, it is interesting that in support of this contention, it articulated
its concerns about the subjectivity of medical opinion evidence.  In
other words, just as the SSA has and continues to struggle with the
subjectivity of medical opinion evidence, the Court also acknowledged
that judicial disability determinations are fraught with the uncer-
tainty and inconsistency that comes from reliance on medical opinion.
The notion that a decision regarding disability benefits is “accu-
rate” necessarily rests on an assumption that there is some objective
truth about a claimant that could be discovered through appropriate
review and investigation.  But if subjective “truths”—level of pain,
level of confusion, disorientation, fatigue, etc.—are recognized as le-
gitimate considerations, then whether a claimant’s application for
benefits was accurately awarded or denied highly depends not only on
the objective medical evidence, but also whether the subjective evi-
dence provided was deemed credible and persuasive.  Learning how to
present the subjective evidence in a manner that leads to a specific,
objectively reasonable conclusion then becomes the work of the claims
examiner and the claimant.  In other words, having access to a legally
trained advocate who has access to a legally trained doctor is critical
to obtaining the desired outcome in a case where the claimed disabil-
ity is difficult to determine objectively.
B. The Search for Accuracy and Consistency: Regulatory
and Contractual Amendments
The economic downturn of the 1970s lead to a substantial increase
in social security disability claims.120  While the increase in claims
ERISA Cases After Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 13 MICH. ST. U.J.
MED. & L. 157 (2009) (explaining how Nord affects the evidentiary weight of
treating physician opinions).
119. Cummins v. Schweiker, 670 F.2d 81, 84 (7th Cir. 1982).
120. David H. Autor & Mark G. Duggan, The Growth in the Social Security Disability
Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 72, 89 (2006).  From 1978,
as Autor and Duggan point out, it is clear that disability claims increase simulta-
neously with unemployment rate increases. Id. at 89 fig.4.  Perhaps ironically, in
the early seventies the disability income program expanded which resulted in a
great deal more claims being granted. Id. at 77–78.  The increase in disability
income awards, which occurred alongside the increase in disability income
claims, contributed to a public sense that the program had become fiscally much
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alone—without regard to the merits of those claims—caused its own
problems for the SSA, the substantial number of court reversals of
SSA hearing examiner decisions became newsworthy.121  During this
period, judges, congressional representatives, and the press con-
stantly criticized the SSA for getting it wrong.122  Tales of claimants
who died before the courts could reverse their wrongful denials were
told along with tales of ne’er-do-wells who were claiming disability
rather than working because they could.123  Such tales led to Congres-
sional hearings and redoubling of agency efforts to come up with regu-
lations that would produce more consistent and accurate outcomes.124
The result, however, was to decontextualize the criteria needed to
prove disability and to create a definition that was increasingly legally
rather than medically based.125
too expensive to maintain and an urgency that it be scaled back. Id.; see gener-
ally Patricia P. Martin & David A. Weaver, Social Security: A Program and Pol-
icy History, 66 SOC. SEC. BULL. 1 (2005), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/X6JR-
FH9U; Program Cost and Size, SOC. SEC. ADMIN, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/
chartbooks/disability_trends/sect01.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2014), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/X6JR-FH9U.
121. See Cathryn Miller-Wilson, Becoming Poor: Stories of the Real “Safety Net” and
the Consequences for Middle America, 13 QUINNIPIAC U. HEALTH L.J. 1, 35–36
(2009) (“[A] substantial number of initial denials are reversed; two thirds of the
cases appealed result in eventual distribution of benefits.”  (citing Erik Eckholm,
Disability Cases Last Longer as Backlog Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007, http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/12/10/us/10disability.html, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/FJM-9BQH)).
122. FRANK S. BLOCH, DISABILITY DETERMINATION: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND
THE ROLE OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL 101–02 (1992).  As a result of a number of re-
ports and studies done by the General Accounting Office in the early 1980s, SSA
determined that as many as 18% of disability beneficiaries were not in fact “dis-
abled according to the statutory standard” and as many as “33 percent of disabil-
ity beneficiaries might no longer be disabled.” Id. at 100.
123. Id.
124. See S. REP. NO. 94-550, at 4 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.A.N.N. 2347, 2350
(discussing the need to improve the “validity” of SSI hearings by modifying evi-
dentiary requirements); see also S. REP. NO. 96-408, at 30, 52, 55 (1980), re-
printed in 1980 U.S.C.A.N.N. 1277, 1308, 1330, 1333 (discussing balance between
decision making quality and timeliness, recommending new policies to improve
the quality of disability–adjudicatory decision making).
125. See Brian C. Murchison, Treating Physicians as Expert Witnesses in Compensa-
tion Systems: The Public Health Connection, 90 KY. L.J. 891, 917 (2002) (“[T]he
genesis of the SSA’s five-step sequential framework for determinations of disabil-
ity, [is] a controlled analytic process designed to ‘allow the most straightforward
cases to be decided quickly and efficiently on medical grounds alone’ and intended
overall to produce ‘consistent, standardized decisions.’” (footnotes omitted) (quot-
ing FRANK S. BLOCH, DISABILITY DETERMINATION: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
AND THE ROLE OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL 7 (1992); Rachel Schneider, Comment, A
Role for the Courts: Treating Physician Evidence in Social Security Determina-
tions, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 391, 395 (1996))).
While creating a definition that ensures determinations are based on “medical
grounds alone” seems intuitively correct, the five-step sequential framework and
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As disability claims increased on the private side just as rapidly as
they had in the public sector,126 insurance companies—facing large
payouts—also struggled with the accuracy of determinations.  Be-
cause their motives were profit driven, they, of course, sought to
lessen their liability through any legal means.  Recognizing that
mental illness was usually diagnosed through subjective observations
and assessments, private disability insurance companies issued poli-
cies that created a cap on how long claimants could receive disability
insurance for mental impairments.127  Although the claimant is re-
quired, under the terms of most policies, to provide medical evidence
of mental illness just like he or she would have to for a physical im-
pairment, the policy usually clearly indicates that if the impairment is
due to a mental illness, then the most the claimant could collect under
the policy are one or two years of benefits.  For physical ailments, how-
ever, most policies provide benefits for as long as the claimant can
show that he or she is physically disabled and unable to work or at
least until retirement age, whichever is sooner.  For the long term
benefits most claimants seek, the claimants have to prove, through
the provision of objective medical evidence, that they are physically
disabled in accordance with the terms of the policy.128
The five-step sequential process of determining disability in the
public context129 and the objective-evidence criteria required in the
its controlled analytic process causes determinations to be based on legal
grounds, not medical.  The medical evidence that has been gathered is fitted into
this legal definition.  However, the legal definition does not contain room for med-
ical opinion, only medical fact evidence.  Therefore, medical opinion evidence is
given little if any weight in the determination process.  But medical opinion is
part and parcel of a doctor’s process in determining whether a patient is medi-
cally disabled.  Separating doctors’ opinion from the “medical facts” they submit
is not something practicing physicians normally or comfortably do.  Thus, while
the motivation for the creation of the five-step process was most certainly an at-
tempt to be more medically based, in practice, it is much more reliant on the legal
organization of medical facts—divorced from medical opinion—then on pure med-
ical grounds.
126. 2013 Long Term Disability Claims Review, COUNCIL FOR DISABILITY AWARENESS,
http://www.disabilitycanhappen.org/research/CDA_LTD_Claims_Survey_2013
.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/R5K-TBDE;
2010 Long-Term Disability Claims Review, COUNCIL FOR DISABILITY AWARENESS,
http://www.disabilitycanhappen.org/pdfs/research/CDA
_LTD_Claims_Survey_2010.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2014), archived at http://per
ma.unl.edu/UG5P-WSYJ.
127. Miller-Wilson, supra 121, at 11 (citing Frank N. Darras, Cause or Symptom? Two R
Key Court Decisions Define the Limitations of Mental Illness Insurance Claims,
BEST’S REVIEW, Mar. 1, 2006, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Cause+or+symptom
%3F+Two+key+court+decisions+definie+the+limitations+of+...-a0143437062,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/82QG-W4L9).
128. Id. at 11–12, nn. 35–36.
129. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2014).  These are the steps Social Security uses to decide if
a claimant is eligible for benefits.  At any stage, if the claimant does not meet the
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private context make it clear that consulting physicians for both gov-
ernment and industry need legal training.  Rather than approach the
question of whether a particular claimant is medically disabled—a
question that any qualified doctor should be able to answer given his
or her training and expertise—doctors are asked to answer the ques-
tion of whether a particular claimant’s medical facts meet certain nar-
rowly proscribed legal criteria.  That question is not a medical one, it
is a legal one.  Therefore, consulting doctors need to be trained and
educated about the law and legal requirements such as: When and
how do certain criteria have to be applied?  How should the evidence
provided be evaluated in light of the legal criteria (rather than in light
of the doctor’s opinion about whether the claimant is disabled)?  Effec-
tively, medical–legal partnerships between consulting physicians and
the lawyers and legal advocates representing the government and in-
dustry’s interests, who were involved in the claims review process,
had to be created in order for the consulting doctors to be able to do
their jobs.130
Courts, meanwhile, watched this unfold and realized that physi-
cians’ sworn statements—viewed as sacrosanct because of their relia-
bility—were in fact neither more nor less reliable than any other type
of opinion evidence.  Industry- and government-created medical–legal
partnerships revealed that medical opinion evidence is not a house
built on a firm foundation of objective evidence, but is instead a house
of cards built on physicians’ subjective judgments.  This revelation, in
turn, has contributed to the urgency felt by the courts and Congress to
continue to seek greater and better ways to make more accurate, con-
sistent and efficient determinations.131
criteria, Social Security will reject the claim.  The first step considers work activ-
ity, steps two and three consider medical severity of the disability in accordance
with the preapproved list of a disabilities, step four considers a claimant’s
residual functional capacity and past work history, and step five considers the
residual functional capacity in relation to age, education, and work experience.
Id.
130. B.P. Wolff & William G. Hamm, What about the Social Security Medical Consult-
ant, 76 J. MED. ASS’N GA. 515, 517 (1987) (stating that the State requires an
intensive two week training for Social Security medical reviewers); Winston
Chung, Doctors Trade Integrity for Insurance Company Profit, SFGATE (May 10,
2013, 6:45 AM), http://blog.sfgate.com/wchung/2011/05/10/doctors-trade-integ
rity-for-insurance-company-profits/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/UX3X-
X8UE (discussing how health insurance companies create formulas that they
teach to medical reviewers to aid in rejecting claims); Evan George, Doctors Paid
to Aid in Disability Denials, DAILY J. (Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.disabilityright-
slegalcenter.org/sites/disabilityrightslegalcenter.org/files/about/documents/Doc
torsPaidtoAidinDisabilityDenials-DJ10-13-09.pdf, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/395P-MN4J (describing how private firms that review claims for private in-
surance companies coach their physician reviewers).
131. Since the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935, there have been over 15
major legislative initiatives to amend the Act, such as the 1965 Amendments im-
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This quest, however, has severely inhibited indigent claimants’
ability to support their claims.  The regular standards employed in an-
alyzing whether a person is disabled for purposes of receiving a partic-
ular benefit are generated and applied by lawyers to physician-created
records.  This results, inevitably, in a large gap between what is re-
quired and what is provided.  Claimants with resources can pay doc-
tors to review the necessary information for effective compliance with
the disability-application requirements and to consult with an attor-
ney regarding those requirements.  Indigent claimants, however, have
no ability to reimburse their doctor for taking this extra time.  Conse-
quently and unsurprisingly, little more than a photocopy of incom-
plete medical records is what is provided on behalf of indigent
disabled claimants.  The medical records are often incomplete because
medical professionals create them for the purposes of providing treat-
ment, not for purposes of bolstering a disability claim.132
While perhaps it is appropriate to leave the question of actual disa-
bility to the fact-finder, the fact-finder in a disability claim proceeding
must rely on the “facts” provided by both sides in order to make his or
her determination.  Where a medical–legal team develops the “facts”
supporting the insurer, it is unsurprising that these would be deemed
more creditable than the “facts” developed by a lone physician.  Physi-
cians for indigent claimants have not had the same access to training
and education that would assist them in providing information re-
sponsive to the regulations or contract definitions as their social se-
curity or private-insurance-company physician counterparts.  The
narrowly drawn questions of the regulation or contract are confusing
and misleading to doctors who are used to providing a fuller, more
nuanced picture of their patient’s health when asked for information.
So, where the agency and industry doctors have access to legal infor-
mation and legal advice about the meanings of the questions and how
to answer them, indigent claimants’ doctors do not.  In short, the
agency and industry doctors have access to and are part of an interdis-
ciplinary medical–legal partnership.
In addition to recognizing how the quest for more accurate, consis-
tent and efficient claims has resulted in effective medical–legal part-
nerships on the part of government and private industry, it is
important to recognize that despite the seeming objectivity of an in-
plementing the Medicare Program and the 1984 Disability Amendments which
reorganized the Continuing Disability Reviews program. See Legislative History,
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/history/law.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2014),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/L7UM-UAVM; see also History of the SSI Pro-
gram, SOC. SEC. ADMIN (2000), http://www.ssa.gov/history/pdf/ssi.pdf, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/AHZ6-66KL (providing a detailed report of the legislative
changes made to the program between 1972-1999).  For changes in the private
sector, see Goodley, infra note 172; Harmon, supra note 118.
132. These differences are discussed in greater depth infra Part IV.
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creased focus on “medical fact” rather than medical opinion, subjectiv-
ity still plays an enormous role in disability decisions.133  The
increased complexity of legal definitions has merely changed the focus
from unfettered medical evidence to carefully legally organized evi-
dence.  Government and industry physicians are trained to provide in-
formation that is responsive to the regulation, but the very parties
trying to reduce costs provide the training.134  Therefore, it is easy to
see how emphasis regarding the meanings and process of applying the
legal definitions comes from the agency or industry perspective, not
the perspective of the claimants.  But, while a process that involves
greater clarity and specificity of a legal definition is presumptively
more efficient, there is little evidence to suggest that this results in
more consistent or more accurate decisions.135
These private and government medical–legal partnerships have
highlighted the gap between the requirements and the evidence, the
general effectiveness of medical–legal partnerships and the need for
133. Frank S. Bloch, Medical Proof, Social Policy, and Social Security’s Medically Cen-
tered Definition of Disability, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 189, 231 (2007); Lars Noah,
Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis As A Legal Construct, 50 HASTINGS L.J.
241, 246–47 (1999); Margaret C. Rodgers, Subjective Pain Testimony in Disability
Determination Proceedings: Can Pain Alone Be Disabling?, 28 CAL. W. L. REV.
173 (1992); Schneider, supra note 108, at 402. R
134. Bernard P. Wolff & William G. Hamm, “What About the Social Security Medical
Consultant?,” 76 J. MED. ASS’N GA. 515, 517 (1987) (“[T]he Social Security physi-
cian mainly bases his assessment on existing rules and regulations.”). BLOCH,
supra note 122, at 101, discusses this as well: “[A]s Martha Derthick has noted, R
‘[d]isability decisions, because of their inherent subjectivity, were highly suscepti-
ble to changes in the political context—and “crackdown” was in the air.’ ” Id.
(quoting MARTHA DERTHICK, AGENCY UNDER STRESS: THE SOCIAL SECURITY AD-
MINISTRATION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 44 (1990)).
There is similar evidence of the training and motivations on the private side.
See Chung, supra note 130 (“I have seen documents that require nurses and doc- R
tors to adhere rigidly to the guidelines and they are penalized for introducing any
element of clinical judgment that varies from the strict criteria that is to be ap-
plied.”); George, supra note 130 (“These firms coach their doctors . . . to use strict R
medical definitions they provide to determine a person’s ability to work.”).
135. See Bloch, supra note 133 (outlining the definition of disability and its applica- R
tion); John J. Capowski, Accuracy and Consistency in Categorical Decision-Mak-
ing: A Study of Social Security’s Medical-Vocational Guidelines—Two Birds with
One Stone or Pigeon-Holing Claimants?, 42 MD. L. REV. 329 (1983) (criticizing the
guidelines for failing to achieve their major goals of accuracy and consistency); see
generally JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS: A
STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY HEARING SYSTEM (1978).  In the private context,
see Do Private Long-Term Disability Policies Provide the Protection They Prom-
ise?: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Fin., 111th Cong. 96 (2010) (statement of
Mark D. DeBofsky, Att’y at Law, Adjunct Professor of Law John Marshall Law
School) (discussing “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review employed in
ERISA disability insurance cases and stating that this has “elevated” the concept
of deference to the insurance companies’ determination “above the goal of assur-
ing an accurate claim decision”).
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the advocacy community to respond in kind by forming medical–legal
partnerships on behalf of the indigent disabled.
IV. THE MEDICAL–LEGAL GAP: PHYSICIAN PERSPECTIVES
VS. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
Before moving forward in the analysis of the tension between legal
and medical definitions of disability, it is important to highlight the
myriad ways in which physician and lawyer roles and actions differ.
Doctors’ perceptions, training, and demands on their time are com-
pletely different from and counterproductive to—from an advocacy
perspective—those of a lawyer.  When faced with a request for infor-
mation regarding a claimant’s ability to work, doctors incorrectly draft
responses under the assumption that they know the training and
background of those who will be reading their responses and how
those readers will respond.  There are four specific ways in which doc-
tor and lawyer differences overburden physicians and doom disability
claims to fail: (1) with respect to legal definitions; (2) with respect to
medical records—methodology and goals; (3) with respect to eviden-
tiary standards; and (4) with respect to the purposes of reviews.
A. Medical Definitions vs. Legal Definitions
Social Security’s definition of disability is not the same as the defi-
nition of disability provided in a private disability insurance policy.136
Furthermore, Social Security’s definition is a matter of federal law
and regulation, as well as years of interpretive case law.137  The defi-
nitions provided in a private insurance policy differ from policy to pol-
icy and are interpreted as a term of the contract—the actual insurance
policy itself.138
These differences in the legal definition of disability do not rest
with disability income claims.  The disabled are also eligible for stu-
136. See Part I – General Information, SOC. SEC. ADMIN, http://www.ssa.gov/disability/
professionals/bluebook/general-info.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2014), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/L6FY-EZ8H (describing “disability” as “the inability to en-
gage in any substantial gainful activity (SGA) by reason of any medically deter-
minable physical or mental impairment(s) which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months”); see also Private Disability Benefits, GLAD 2–3 (March
2014), http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/publications/disability-benefits.pdf,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/8DVP-6D2T (noting that most private disability
insurance policies define disability as either (1) being unable to complete mate-
rial job tasks of the current job, or (2) having trouble performing any job tasks).
137. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002) (upholding the Social Security
Administration’s construction of the Social Security Act as requiring the claimant
to demonstrate that she cannot perform any gainful act of employment for at
least one year in order to qualify as disabled under the Act).
138. See Private Disability Benefits, supra note 136. R
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dent loan assistance and can purchase disability insurance to cover
mortgage or credit card payments.  Despite the fact that federal stu-
dent loan discharges are also governed by federal law, the Department
of Education has created its own separate definition of “total and per-
manent disability” which is different than the SSA’s.139  And of
course, the disability insurance policies that cover mortgage pay-
ments, credit card payments, and private student loans, all contain
their own definitions of disability.140  The definitions of disability also
differ widely on premium-waiver applications for life insurance.141  In
the employment context, the definitions for being disabled, and there-
fore needing an accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, are different than the definitions for qualifying for family medical
leave under the Family Medical Leave Act.142  To claim any or all of
these benefits, disabled claimants must provide evidence from their
physician, which is then subject to different legal standards depending
on the claim being made.
Doctors, however, define disability medically.  That is to say, what
they deem to be disabling, debilitating, or incapacitating is based on
their scientific knowledge, their experience with the patient, and their
own experience and personal biases about what a patient should or
should not be able to do given their illness(es), the course of treat-
139. 34 C.F.R. § 674.51(aa)(1) (2014).
140. See Explaining Ways the Social Security Administration Can Improve the Disa-
bility Review Process: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Health
Care & Entitlements of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong.
36–47 (2014) (STATEMENT OF MARIANNA LACANFORA, ACTING DEPUTY COMM’R FOR
RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY POLICY, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION), archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/7RHY-DQVH; A Workers’ Most Valuable Asset: Protecting
Your Financial Future with Disability Insurance, NAT’L ASSOC. OF INS. COMM’RS
(November 2011), http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer_alert_protecting_fi
nancial_future_disability_insurance.htm, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/H5Z9-
2CSX (confirming the proposition that the definition of disability will vary by
policy offered).
141. CIGNA’s Waiver of Premium with Extended Death Benefit, CITY OF KETTERING,
http://www.ketteringoh.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Waiver-of-Premiu-FAQ
.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/TXB4-XNLF
(“Disabled employees must meet the definition of disability that applies during
the waiver waiting period – they must be disabled from their regular occupation
or receiving disability benefits under the employer’s plan.”); Sun Life Financial,
Group Life Waiver of Premium Frequently Asked Questions, KADEC, http://www
.kadlec.org/uploads/employee_section/SunLife_Group_Life_Waiver_of_Premium_
1.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/JDP2-WB4Z
(“[A] person is considered totally disabled if he or she is unable to perform the
material and substantial duties of any occupation for which he or she is qualified
(or becomes reasonably qualified) due to education, training, or experience. The
disability must be caused by an injury or sickness.”)
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2014) (ADA definition of “dis-
ability”); Id. § 825.113 (stating the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 defini-
tion of “serious health condition”).
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ment, and compliance with that treatment.143  Lawyer Rachel Schnei-
der puts it most succinctly:
The expertise of physicians is in the identification of impairment, not disa-
bility.  The identification of disability therefore calls for the translation of a
medical concept into legally relevant terms, and is best completed by those
with an understanding of the legal standard.  Under this view, the definitions
of disability in the medical and legal communities differ because they serve
different purposes.  The medical definition is directed towards treatment,
while the legal definition focuses on compensability.144
All of these differences have important implications for a patient
who is seeking benefits.
B. Medical Records: Doctor Goals vs. Legal Documentation
Requirements
A doctor’s goals when creating medical records often conflict with
the goals of a patient who needs those medical records to prove disa-
bility.  Doctors record patient complaints to the extent that they are a
necessary consideration for a doctor when contemplating treat-
ment.145  A doctor, whose every effort is bent on medical success, gen-
erally only notes signs of progress in a patient’s record.  Doctors have
no reason to document medical failures unless it is to provide them-
selves a record that a particular course of treatment had already been
tried and therefore new or different courses of treatment are
necessary.
When all treatment options available have been tried and have
failed, however, repetitive statements documenting the patient’s lack
of responsiveness are not part of what a doctor needs to verify in writ-
ing.146  Once a doctor has reached the end of the treatment road, regu-
143. See Schneider, supra note 108, at 392 (“[A]ttempts by Congress and the SSA to R
objectively define disability in these programs belies medical reality and reveals
the second theme in this debate over disability.  The SSA has aimed for an objec-
tive definition of disability in order to bureaucratize and generalize disability de-
terminations.  However, this admirable attempt to treat all applicants equally
has lead to overgeneralization since individualized determinations would be more
consistent with medical definitions of disability.”).
144. Id. at 407 (footnotes omitted).
145. See Serguei Pakhomov et al., Agreement Between Patient-reported Symptoms and
Their Documentation in the Medical Record, 14 AM. J. MANAGING CARE 530
(2008); Jan-Joost Rethans et al., To What Extent do Clinical Notes by General
Practitioners Reflect Actual Medical Performance? A Study Using Simulated Pa-
tients, 44 BRIT. J. GEN. PRAC. 153, 154 (1994); Annette S. Stro¨mgren et al., Does
the Medical Record Cover the Symptoms Experienced by Cancer Patients Receiv-
ing Palliative Care? A Comparison of Record and Patient Self-Rating, 21 J. OF
PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 189 (2001).
146. See Rethans supra note 145.  This article records the results of an examination of R
“the extent to which clinical notes in medical records of general practice consulta-
tions reflected doctors’ actual performance during consultations.” Id. at 153.  The
findings generally suggest, “clinical notes inadequately reflected the actual con-
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lar check-ups are not meant to redocument what is already known.
They are meant merely to determine if there are other, heretofore un-
known and undocumented symptoms that have cropped up.  If things
remain the same, that is, the patient’s disease is progressing as ex-
pected and no new medical issues have arisen, doctors will frequently
record positive remarks such as, “patient doing well,” “patient stable,”
“patient has no new complaints.”147  These remarks are not intended
by the physician as evidence of the patient’s ability to work or func-
tion—as the law defines those terms.  They are merely evidence that
nothing medically new has happened to the patient.
Additionally, while any good doctor will be responsive to patient
complaints, especially repeated ones that the patient claims are
debilitating, doctors also know and understand the limits of science.
Therefore, while responsiveness will often take the form of various di-
agnostic tests in an effort to rule out certain conditions, the limits of
the tests are well known and accepted.  A patient whose symptoms
remain undiagnosed but, despite on-going complaints manages to
have some good days, will eventually be told that nothing further can
be done.  Medicines and referrals to mental-health professionals, or
both, prescribed to help a patient cope with debilitating symptoms
which do not appear to be treatable will be provided, but the chart will
focus on the medical successes in the patient—a decreasing viral load,
a healed bone fracture, even a cured cancer—rather than on the tire-
some symptoms that can neither be explained nor treated.148
sultation and thus were insufficiently valid” and further that “doctors perform
differently when patients present with chronic disease compared with acute
problems.” Id. at 154.  Specifically, the records of those doctors whose patients
presented with a chronic disease contained even less information then those
whose patients presented with acute pain. See also Herbert A. Simon, Artificial-
Intelligence Approaches to Problem Solving and Clinical Diagnosis, in Logic of
Discovery and Diagnosis in Medicine 87 (Kenneth F. Schaffner ed., 1985) (“From
the therapeutic or ‘troubleshooting’ standpoint we want to follow the causal
stream up to a point where intervention is possible”).  When the diagnosis of an
illness is clear and all available treatments have been tried, there is little more to
record unless a change in symptoms is significant enough to convince the doctor
that perhaps there is an additional diagnosis and course of treatment. See Noah,
supra note 133, at 246–47. R
147. See Cathryn Miller-Wilson, Karam Mounzer, & Danielle Mourar, Medical-Legal
Collaboration—Beyond Partnerships—The Cornerstone Of Effective Advocacy
For The Disabled In The Modern World (March 1, 2012) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author).
148. Id.; see also Noah supra note 133, at 247 (“Physicians view patient care as an R
iterative process designed to treat a condition to the best extent possible.  They do
not care much about the disease’s etiology—the theory of its origin or cause—
unless understanding causation would assist in diagnosis and treatment.”).
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However, an insurer or other arbiter of patient claims usually uses
the recorded medical successes as evidence of ability to work.149  But
conversations with the treating professionals upon news of the pa-
tient’s claim denial will almost always reveal surprise and consterna-
tion on the part of the doctor who never intended his personal
checklist of accomplishments on the patient’s behalf to be used to deny
an extremely disabled patient a source of income.
C. Evidentiary Standards: The Legal Myth of Medically
Objective Evidence
The disconnect between what medical records actually document
and what insurers and government officials use them to prove is high-
lighted by the oft-repeated legal requirement of “objective evi-
dence.”150  Most legal definitions of disability require the claimant to
149. See McLaughlin v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., 319 F. Supp. 2d 115, 127 (D.
Mass. 2004) (holding that Prudential’s Medical Director’s findings were credibly
supported by the record even though, admittedly they focused on “cited notations
culled from successive visits stating that McLaughlin, ‘has done quite
nicely . . . starting to regain her strength,’ ‘doing well . . . pleased with her pro-
gress,’ and ‘continues to show marked improvement . . . normal strength both
proximally and distally (in the [lower extremities])’” and ignored “adverse aspects
of the record on which the Medical Director could have relied in reaching a differ-
ent conclusion”).
It should be noted that a major factor in the court’s upholding of the insurance
company’s decision in McLaughlin was their earlier determination that applica-
tion of the “arbitrary and capricious” review standard was appropriate. Id. at
125.  As the court ultimately stated, “if reviewed de novo [the case] might be de-
cided differently.” Id. at 127.  The significance of the legal standard of review is
yet another aspect of disability determinations that is far beyond the training,
understanding and experience of most doctors.  While insurance industry doctors
receive training that enables them to ensure that their opinions are in keeping
with the legal standards that will be applied, no such training, outside of a delib-
erately created interdisciplinary partnership between claimant’s doctors and
their lawyers, exists for claimants’ doctors.
For another example, see Skretvedt v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 268
F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2001), abrogated by Metro. Life. Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105
(2008).  In that case, long-term employee Skretvedt brought an ERISA action
against his former employer in order to challenge its denial of his claim for long-
term disability benefits.  In reviewing the evidence, the court remarked on a par-
ticular set of handwritten notes, written by Skretvedt’s two physician’s, Dr. Schiff
and Dr. Binhammer, and submitted by Dupont as evidence that the plaintiff was
not disabled. Id. at 181.  The notes revealed that the plaintiff was “much im-
proved on Paxil” and that the plaintiff’s “[d]epressive Medical [sic] illness [had]
improved.” Id. at 182 (alteration in original).  Dupont argued that these com-
ments indicated that plaintiff’s condition was not permanent and therefore, the
plaintiff did not meet their definition of disabled.  The circuit court understood
this was not the case, stating the notes made it clear that the doctors believed the
plaintiff’s condition had improved, “not that it had improved to a point where he
was capable of performing his previous job at Dupont.” Id.
150. See Huffaker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 271 Fed. Appx. 493, 500 (6th Cir.
2008) (upholding the rule that an ERISA disability benefits plan can require a
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provide objective evidence, in the form of diagnostic tests, of disabil-
ity.151  However, doctors know and understand that a disabled indi-
vidual will not always have irrefutable diagnostic proofs and
unequivocal answers to all their disabling complaints.  First, diagnos-
tic tools, regardless of their sophistication, do not always reveal the
existence or severity level of a patient’s disabling condition.152  Sec-
ond, patients often do not have access to the diagnostic tools that
might provide this information precisely because their disabling con-
dition has prevented them from working and obtaining adequate
health insurance.153  Thus, even where diagnostic tools would actually
claimant provide objective medical evidence of disability); see also Johnson v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 437 F.3d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that an
ERISA plan administrator can require “objective evidence” of a claimant’s disa-
bility in deciding whether to deny or approve a claim for long-term disability
under the plan).
151. The social security disability statute requires a claimant to have a “ ‘medically
determinable physical or mental impairment’ evidenced by measurable outward
signs of disability; patient reports of symptoms and pain will not suffice unless
supported by and consistent with objective evidence.” Crossley, supra note 41, at R
629 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1995)).  In the private disability income
context, see Rafik, supra note 41. R
152. See, e.g., George R. Parkerson Jr. et al., Classification of Severity of Health
Problems in Family/General Practice: An International Field Trial, 13 FAM.
PRAC. 303, 303–04 (1996) (noting the difficulty in assessing severity of symptoms
and recognizing the importance in adequate diagnostic tools).
153. See Skredvedt, 268 F.3d at 182 (noting that “Skretvedt had no health insurance
during much of the period from 1995 to 1997 and was unable to pay for
treatments”).
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPAC), Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 42 and 26 U.S.C.), does
provide some premium assistance to employers to assist their early retiring for-
mer employees with premiums or health care costs and provides some tax credits
to assist families needing assistance in purchasing health insurance. See id.
§§ 1102, 1401, 1402.  Additionally, there are a variety of provisions in the PPAC
that affect premium costs and health care costs, generally, in an attempt to make
health care more affordable. See id. §§ 1003, 1311, 1401–1563.  However, while
PPAC provides states with funding to expand their Medicaid program, not all
states have agreed to take this money.  Therefore, the problem of the indigent
disabled falling into a health insurance gap at a time when coverage for treat-
ments and medical support for disability-related benefits is most crucial remains.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII)) (2012); Amy Lischko & Beth Waldman,
Understanding State Resistance to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act: Is it Really Just Politics as Usual?, 9 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 27 (2013);
Robert Pear & Michael Cooper, Reluctance in Some States Over Medicaid Expan-
sion, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/30/us/politics/
some-states-reluctant-over-medicaid-expansion.html?pagewanted=all, archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/E3PR-QH35.
Additionally, while the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1985 (COBRA), Pub. L. No 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986), provides most former em-
ployees with the ability to retain their health insurance, they can only do so by
paying the premiums. See 29 U.S.C. §§1001–03 (2012).  Clearly, a person who is
no longer working and who is in the process of applying for disability-related in-
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provide the necessary objective evidence to confirm disability, many
patients do not have access to these tools because they simply cannot
afford them.
Whether through a simple in-office test or through costly, sophisti-
cated technology, the patient must have the income to get to the doc-
tor’s office and the health insurance to be seen by the doctor in order
to provide results that verify the existence of disabling conditions.
Without these, the tests cannot be performed and the objective evi-
dence required cannot be provided.154
In any event, as already stated, clinicians will not always be able to
corroborate a patient’s claimed inability to work with a specific test or
diagnosis.  Medical science recognizes its limitation in understanding
the underlying physiopathology of several distinct clinical entities and
in identifying the appropriate diagnostic tools.155  The world of claims
processing, governed by legal definitions and requirements, however,
does not.  A doctor’s claim that a patient is too fatigued to work, with-
out lab tests to substantiate their complaint—low testosterone, ane-
mia, low thyroid hormone level, low cortisol level, or the presence of a
superimposed disease accounting for their fatigue—will be trivialized
and likely ultimately ignored by an insurer, employer, or creditor.156
come benefits does not, in fact, have any income at the moment of application.
Therefore, absent having savings or a source of income from another family mem-
ber, the “right” to continue employer-provided health insurance does not actually
result in disabled persons having health insurance.
154. Note that many private insurers will follow up with a claimant’s scant records
and pay for various diagnostic tests and examinations in an effort to assist a
claimant in making their claim.  However, the tests themselves often give results
that need to be interpreted rather than clear-cut, unbiased, and objective conclu-
sions.  For those tests open to interpretation, the insurance industry doctor will
find that the results are “inconclusive” or “not supportive of claimant’s claimed
level of severity.” See George, supra note 130.  Additionally, doctors often treat R
sick patients without giving a formal diagnosis.  Without this formal diagnosis,
however, disability insurance companies will reject them. Id.; see also Noah,
supra note 133, at 246–47 (stating that physicians do not focus on the accuracy of R
the diagnosis but rather the treatment).
155. See Miller-Wilson et al., supra note 147 (citing Lesley M. Arnold et al., Evaluat- R
ing and Diagnosing Fibromyalgia and Comorbid Psychiatric Disorders, 69 J.
CLIN. PSYCHIATRY e28 (2008); Lorenzo Lorusso et al., Immunological Aspects of
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, 8 AUTOIMMUNITY REVIEWS 287 (2009)).
156. See Miller-Wilson et al., supra note 147.  In discussing the theoretical medical R
model of disability, Professor Mary Crossley points out that, “because [medical
professionals] focus on classifying the nature and causes of impairment, medical
professionals may have a tendency both to falsely universalize the impact of a
particular impairment and to fail to recognize that a given impairment may pro-
duce varying degrees of limitation in different people.”  Crossley, supra note 41, R
at 650–51 (footnote omitted).  It is precisely this problem of universalization that
undercuts government and industry attempts to render more accurate decisions.
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D. Medical Records Revisited: Medical Follow-up vs. Legal
Reviews
The final gap between the legal standard that must be proved in a
disability income matter and what actually medically occurs during
the life of a disabled patient is with respect to determinations that
occur after an initial finding of disability.  Both the public and private
systems require periodic reviews of a person’s “on-going disability”
even after determining that a patient meets the definition of disability
and is eligible for benefits.157  In some contexts, these periodic reviews
can occur as often as every three months.158
For any chronic sufferer of disease, a doctor will ensure that peri-
odic appointments are made.  However, the frequency of these ap-
pointments very much depends on the nature of the disease and the
likelihood that the appointments will yield a medically important de-
velopment.  If there is little expectation that the patient will have
medical needs at frequent intervals, appointments will not be sched-
uled at frequent intervals.  Doctors will not schedule more frequent
appointments to deal with the patient’s legal need for updated
paperwork, nor is it likely that doctors will even calendar the deadline
for completion of the patient’s legal paperwork.  Doctors’ calendars
generally include only those appointments and obligations that are re-
lated to their patients’ medical issues and needs.  Thus, what appears
to be a simple legal burden—the timely provision of medical evidence
in support of a client’s claim—is in fact a frequent cause of disallow-
ance of a client’s claim.
The difficulty filling out paperwork in a timely fashion also stems
from the differences in training between lawyers and physicians.
157. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594 (2014); Palmer v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 415 F. App’x 913,
915–16 (10th Cir. 2011) (describing private insurance disability review).
158. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1590(d)–(i) (2014); see also Program Operations Manual
Sysytem, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0428001020 (last
updated Sept. 24, 2013), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/76BP-VFGP (discuss-
ing the different time frames for Continuing Disability Reviews; for example, for
individuals with an impairment expected to improve receive scheduled reviews
every 6-18 months).  When Social Security Disability applications are approved,
the medical updates are generally requested every three or even seven years.
What You Need to Know: Reviewing Your Disability, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. 1 (January
2005), http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10068.pdf, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/9CQF-6GFQ.  However, sometimes an application will be approved for only
one year, in which case an update is requested annually until and unless the
benefit is fully awarded and the update moves to a less frequent timetable. See
id. (providing for earlier review every six to 18 months if improvement is ex-
pected).  Private insurance carriers, however, ask for medical updates at least
annually and more often than not, even more frequently than this. LA. DEP’T OF
INS., CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE 22 (2004) (“The fre-
quency . . . depends upon the particular policy.  For example, a given insurance
company may require such medical updates every month.”).
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From the first day of law school, lawyers are taught that keeping
deadlines—set by courts and legislators—is a critical part of effective
ethical representation.  This is not the case for medical treatment,
which is based on making people healthy, not on filling out paperwork
in a timely manner.
For fairly obvious reasons, however, all requests for documentation
have deadlines.  In an effort to ensure a patient’s application for some
kind of benefit does not languish, providers are asked to complete de-
tailed forms within anywhere from two weeks to thirty days of a re-
quest.159  While most benefit grantors will grant extensions of time if
asked, many patients and providers do not know they can make this
request.  Often, because providers are busy providing medical care to
their patients, deadlines that a patient believes the providers are ad-
hering to pass without the timely completion of the forms.160
Whether a failure occurs because there was no effort to seek more
time or simply because of a memory lapse, if the forms are not timely
provided, the benefits can be terminated, ending what is the only
source of income for the disabled patient.  There are often appeal
rights, but while appeals are pending the benefit is not forthcom-
ing.161  Appeals can take anywhere from thirty days to two years to be
decided.162  While the patient is waiting for the appeal to be decided,
their access to health care is diminished or terminated altogether.
159. Div. of Temp. Disability Ins., Claim for Disability Benefits, STATE OF N.J. DEP’T
OF LABOR & WORKFORCE DEV., http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/forms_pdfs/tdi/
WDS1.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/QN7C-
TYE8 (disability application from New Jersey Department of Labor stating appli-
cant has 30 days to file application; includes section of application to be filled out
by physician); Labor and Workforce Dev. Agency, Physician/Practitioner’s Guide
to Disability Insurance, STATE OF CAL. EMP’T DEV. DEP’T 2, http://www.edd.ca.gov/
pdf_pub_ctr/de2548.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/L4XL-GT2B (describing the need for claimants to file physicians’ medical
extension forms within 20 days of issuance of the notice given to the claimant
that their benefits are about to expire).
160. Richard J. Baron, What’s Keeping Us So Busy in Primary Care? A Snapshot from
One Practice, 362 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1632 (2010) (describing the responsibilities
primary care physicians have outside of the many patients they see); Amy S. Ox-
entenko et al., Time Spent on Clinical Documentation: A Survey of Internal
Medicine Residents and Program Directors, 170 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 377
(2010) (stating that medical internal medicine residents spend almost as much
time on paperwork as seeing patients because they have so much paperwork to
complete); Pauline W. Chen, Doctors and Patients, Lost in Paperwork, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/health/08chen
.html?_r=0 (describing the vast amounts of paperwork that doctors must com-
plete), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/J3X2-CHW5.
161. The Appeals Process, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. 2 (Jan. 2008), http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/
EN-05-10041.pdf, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/9XV-2W8H.
162. Plan to Reduce the Hearings Backlog and Improve Public Service at the Social
Security Administration, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. 3 (Sept. 13, 2007), http://www.ssa.gov/
hearingsbacklog.pdf (showing Chart 2: The Number of Days It Takes to Process a
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V. THE GAP WIDENS: THE RISE IN JUDICIAL SUPPORT OF
NONTREATING PHYSICIAN EVIDENCE
The distinctions between medical and legal perspectives regarding
disability in general are neither new nor particularly surprising, so
why is acknowledging and addressing these differences in perspec-
tives of such great importance now?  The SSA has been making disa-
bility determinations since 1956.163  Insurance companies have been
in the disability business, off and on, since the early 1900s.164  An
analysis of the case law trends over several decades during the twenti-
eth century, however, shows a gradual but alarming trend: while the
treating physician rule was being debated and narrowed and legal def-
initions of disability were rendered more complex, as discussed in Part
III, above, the courts began acknowledging and respecting govern-
ment and industry medical opinion evidence.
As discussed above, the 1970s brought recession and economic
downturn.  Joblessness rose and so did disability claims.165  As a re-
sult, congressional hearings about the ballooning costs of the disabil-
ity program were held, amendments to the SSD and SSI programs
were passed, and the SSA underwent several monumental changes in
order to try to rein in the costs.  There is little discussion in the histor-
ical literature about what all of these changes meant for the SSA’s
relationship with doctors.166  However, a glance at Social Security
Disability decisions from the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s clearly
shows a growing deference towards agency physician reports.  And
embedded in that deference are statements that imply the agency
physician reports are more thorough, more detailed, and therefore
much more worthy of credence than previously given.167
Hearing Has Grown over the Years), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/73TH-
U72B.
163. John R. Kearney, Social Security and the “D” in OASDI: The History of a Federal
Program Insuring Earners Against Disability, 66 SOC. SEC. BULL. 1, 10 (2006).
164. William J. Baker, Disability Income Insurance: An Odyssey, 24 DISABILITY IN-
COME INS. 278 (1992) (citing CHARLES E. SOULE, DISABILITY INCOME INSURANCE:
THE UNIQUE RISK (Jane Lightell ed., 2d ed. 1989)).
165. The rise in disability claims and consequent concern about maintaining the fi-
nancial health of the social security trust is attributed to a number of factors:
slow economic growth, high unemployment, the creation of the SSI program, and
an increase in appeals by denied claimants. See Kearney, supra note 163. R
166. But see BLOCH, supra note 122, at 100–01 (responding to reports of large percent- R
ages of erroneous disability claims decisions, the administration initiated an ac-
celerated review process and an “immediate need for a dramatically increased
amount of medical evidence at the state Disability Determination Services”
which resulted in a huge rise in the use of independent contractor doctors by the
SSA).
167. See Gilliam v. Califano, 472 F. Supp. 598, 602 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (holding in favor of
the Secretary, the court stated, “Plaintiff’s treating physician” delivered “a four
sentence report” whereas “the Secretary’s two examiners . . . filed thorough and
complete physical examination reports. . . .  [T]he Secretary’s decision here is
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The move away from treating physician deference on the private
side begins more convolutedly then on the public side.  The Supreme
Court’s case of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch168 in 1989 is sem-
inal, though it is not about a disability claim.  The plaintiffs in that
case were seeking benefits under a termination plan that was created
and administered by their former employer, Firestone Tire and Rub-
ber Co.169  The Court engaged in a lengthy analysis in order to deter-
mine what standard of review to employ in reviewing the former
employees’ claims under ERISA.170  They held that the standard
should be de novo, “unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or
fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits
or to construe the terms of the plan.”171  While the decision purports
to create greater accountability for plan administrators, in actual ef-
fect, employer-created plans were suddenly revised after this decision
to ensure that the administrators were given discretionary author-
grounded upon the testimony of two competent physicians who have submitted
in-depth medical reports, which were visibly adequate to support his findings
that the claimant was not under a disability as defined by the Social Security
Act”).  Note that in this case, as in the private disability decision noted in Mc-
Laughlin v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., 319 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D. Mass. 2004),
the court admits that there was enough evidence to support an opposite finding
but that they are constrained to hold in favor of the Secretary as the “[c]ourt is
not empowered to consider this case De [sic] novo.” Gilliam, 472 F. Supp. at 602.
Again, social security doctors, just like insurance doctors, presumably must re-
ceive information and training about the legal standard of review, as well as the
legal requirements to prove disability. See also Ward v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 844,
846 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding in favor of the Secretary and stating, “In the present
case, although some medical evidence indicates that Ward suffers from physical
impairments, only rather conclusory statements of one treating physician indi-
cate that Ward’s impairments are substantial or disabling.  Dr. Reynolds[, the
consultative examiner,] expressed this conclusion . . . .”); Mongeur v. Heckler, 722
F.2d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that Social Security’s consultative exam-
iner’s report “constitutes evidence substantial and sufficient to contradict the
opinion” of claimant’s treating physician and treating nurse); Rutherford v.
Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1982) (affirming the ALJ’s denial of disability
benefits); Bolton v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 504 F. Supp. 288, 290
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that there was substantial evidence to support the Sec-
retary’s denial of disability, and considering “reports of two consultative medical
experts who had examined plaintiff in connection with her application for disabil-
ity benefits”).  In Rutherford, 685 F.2d at 61, the court took notice of two Psychi-
atric Consultative Evaluation reports which were provided in support of the
disability examiner’s denial of benefits.  Specifically referring to the more recent
report, the ALJ “found that plaintiff had no significant secondary damage be-
cause of alcoholism.” Id. at 62.  In dissent, Circuit Judge Timbers pointed out,
however, that the ALJ’s reliance on the reports mistakenly failed to evaluate “ap-
pellant’s alcoholism according to his voluntary ability to control its use.” Id. at
65.
168. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
169. Id. at 105–06.
170. Id. at 108–15.
171. Id. at 115.
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ity.172  With those revisions, the standard of review for benefits claims
under employer-provided plans became “arbitrary and capricious.”173
Once the legal standard is thus lowered, it is easy to see how the
Court has laid the groundwork for rejecting treating-physician evi-
dence.  In fact, after Bruch, an administrator who uses his or her own
qualified physician to make a determination cannot be required to,
instead, give extra weight to the treating physician unless the claim-
ant can show that doing so is arbitrary and capricious.  It is clear that
it would be exceedingly difficult to meet this standard if the plan ad-
ministrator had access to qualified physicians to make their own de-
terminations about the claimants.  Thus, while employers and
administrators always utilized medical consults, Bruch created an in-
dustry incentive to increase that usage and streamline the partner-
ship between doctors and industry claims reviewers and lawyers.
In reviewing the increasingly detailed reports of insurers as well as
plaintiffs’ arguments about conflict of interest, the courts have real-
ized that while plaintiffs may have a valid argument that the insurer’s
doctors are merely “physician advocates” for the insurer, this only
highlights the fact that the plaintiffs, for their part, have “physician
advocates” who are equally biased.174  However, at least one author
172. James Goodley, The Effect of Metro. Life v. Glenn on ERISA Benefit Denials:
Time for the “Treating Physician Rule,” 26 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 403,
407 (2010) (“Employers and unions administering ERISA plans wanted more con-
trol of, and deference to, their decision making.  Consequently, and in response to
Bruch, many plans provided provisions including the abuse of discretion stan-
dard of review in controlling plan documents.” (citing Roy F. Harmon III, The
Debate Over Deference in the ERISA Setting—Judicial Review of Decisions by
Conflicted Fiduciaries, 54 S.D. L. REV. 1, 11 (2009)).
173. Davis v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 444 F.3d 569, 575 (7th Cir. 2006) (“When, as
here, the terms of an employee benefit plan afford the plan administrator broad
discretion to interpret the plan and determine benefit eligibility, judicial review
of the administrator’s decision to deny benefits is limited to the arbitrary-and-
capricious standard.”).  And in the lower court’s opinion in Davis, the court cites
to the decision in Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 2000),
for the holding that a “plan administrator’s benefit determinations will be ‘largely
insulated from judicial review by reason of being discretionary.’”  Davis v. Unum
Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 03 C 6362, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7211, at *34 (N.D. Ill.
2005) (citing Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327, 332 (7th Cir. 2000)),
rev’d, 444 F.3d 569 (7th Cir. 2006). See also Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Judi-
cial Review of Denial of Disability Benefits Under Employee Benefit Plan Gov-
erned by Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 1132(a)(1)(b)—Selection and Scope of Particular Standards of Review—Post-
Firestone Cases, 12 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1 (2006) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch . . . established with respect to employee
benefit plans generally that courts are to review denials of benefits under a de
novo standard of review, unless the plan grants discretionary authority to the
plan administrator to make decisions concerning eligibility and benefits.” (cita-
tion omitted)).
174. See Blakley v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 408 (6th Cir. 2009) (discussing
ALJ’s decision to reject treating physician’s assessment of claimant because “the
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has pointed out that the bias of an industry doctor is in no way
equivalent to the bias of a treating physician: the “inherent incentives
and payment designs” are different for a treating physician versus an
industry physician.175
Whether one agrees with this distinction, however, is not neces-
sary to conclude that as a general matter, physicians, like any other
person, are subject to biases—personal, professional, financial and po-
litical.  Judicial excoriation of “physician advocates”176 is therefore
possibility always exists that a doctor may express an opinion in an effort to as-
sist a patient with whom he or she sympathizes for one reason or another . . .  [or]
provide such a note in order to satisfy their patient’s requests and avoid unneces-
sary doctor/patient tension.”); see also Yates v. Colvin, 940 F.Supp 664, 676 (S.D.
Ohio 2013) (citing the language of the Blakley case and describing it as “boiler-
plate” language utilized by ALJs in the Circuit); Wojna v. CIGNA Group Ins., No.
CV 10–07238–JAK (JEMx), 2011 WL 3236025, at *1-3 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2011)
(granting plaintiffs request for the discovery of information to prove bias based on
the amount CIGNA paid to the company that supplied it with medical profession-
als for claims determinations); McGahey v. Harvard University Flexible Benefits
Plan, 685 F.Supp.2d 168, 178-80 (D. Mass. 2009)(questioning the impartiality of
the doctors used by Harvard in the “independent medical examination” of the
claimant).
175. See Goodley, supra note 172, at 432.  Goodley states, “The insurer’s goal is profit R
maximization, despite that [sic] fact that under ERISA, it is supposed to act
‘solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.’ . . .  Though physi-
cians are no doubt subject to pressures from those that are paying them (notwith-
standing their ethical and legal obligations), it would seem the pressures on a
plaintiff’s treating physician would be less serious than on an IME or IEP, be-
cause the IME or IEP is likely to have more repeat business with the insurer.
NELA has noted that although there is some concern about the trustworthiness
of a treating physician, the more pressing issue is the problem of insured plans
hiring repeat IMEs and IEPs who are thus incentivized against the truly inde-
pendent practice of medicine . . . .” Id. at 432–33 (footnotes omitted).
Of course, this defense does not wholly work because presumably what makes
one the treating physician is the fact that he or she can rely on the “repeat busi-
ness” of the patient.  So the real issue is not repeat business, it is repeat lucrative
business.  Although it is generally understood that doctors are well paid, insur-
ance doctors are paid several times more by their insurer clients then they would
be by individual patients and their individual health insurance companies. See
Chung, supra note 130; George, supra note 130; Parija Kavilanz, Doctors: Why We R
Can’t Stay Afloat, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2012/smallbusi-
ness/1201/gallery.doctors-broke/index.html (last updated Jan. 10, 2012), archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/8FNG-D3HU.  Additionally, the process of being paid by
an insurance company for work performed rather than by a patient’s insurance
company in accordance with the individual idiosyncrasies of the patient’s policy is
presumably more efficient and less of a hassle.
176. See Kevin F. Foley, “Physician Advocacy and Doctor Deception A Doubled-Edged
Attack on Due Process,” FED. LAW., July 2001, at 24; see also Davis, 444 F.3d at
578 (referring with incredulity to several of the treating physician’s statements,
and stating, “these examples and others in the record show Dr. Raymond more as
an advocate than as a doctor rendering objective opinions”).  As with Judge Foley,
however, this court confuses dishonesty and significant exaggeration with advo-
cacy.  The examples provided did reasonably raise an inference that the treating
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misplaced—as is the expectation that any person who is asked to pro-
vide a professional opinion is completely neutral.  Professional opinion
is based on training and experience among other things.  Experiences
are necessarily personal to the professional that had them.  It is there-
fore nonsense to exclaim that physician advocates are biased and
therefore unethical and untrustworthy.  Physician advocates are pre-
cisely what the industry realized they could cultivate and, in so doing,
their reliance on their own physicians became more credible.
The case of Davis v. Unum Life Insurance Co. of America177 is a
prime example of how the court is so blinded by their concerns about a
less-than-credible treating physician that they give no acknowledge-
ment whatsoever to the role that the insurance company’s physicians
played in the claims decision.  In that case, the plaintiff, William Da-
vis, applied for long-term disability benefits after his employer fired
him.178  The benefits were awarded for a mental disability but not a
physical one—the difference between two years of disability income
and income until retirement age.179  Davis argued that he had severe
pain, diabetes, and heart trouble and therefore, for physical reasons,
was unable to work.180  Unum had an in-house psychiatrist, orthope-
dic surgeon, internist, a doctor of physical medicine and rehabilita-
tion, a clinical psychologist, and an M.Ed.—a vocational rehabilitation
specialist—examine Davis’s file.181  All of these members of the Unum
team concluded Davis was capable of working at a sedentary job and
had no physical ailments sufficiently severe enough to meet Unum’s
definition of disability.182
On appeal, Davis argued the standard of review should be de novo
rather than the arbitrary and capricious standard usually employed
because Unum’s doctors were biased against him and had a conflict of
interest.183  In response, the court said tellingly,
We presume neutrality “unless a claimant shows by providing specific evi-
dence of actual bias that there is a significant conflict.” . . .  [W]hether a doctor
physician’s records and statements were not credible.  That the physician’s mo-
tive for behaving badly was likely from a desire to help his patient is not in ques-
tion.  But to frame the problem as one of advocacy implies that all physicians who
wish to advocate on behalf of their patients are “not objective,” which overstates
the matter and reinforces the assumption that there are some doctors who are
“neutral or objective.”  All doctors have opinions.  Whether they are effective ad-
vocates in advancing those opinions or ineffective liars and exaggerators largely
depends on their innate abilities, their sense of personal integrity, and their
training and educative contact with lawyers.
177. 444 F.3d 569.
178. Id. at 571.
179. Id. at 571–72.
180. Id. at 573.
181. Id. at 572–73.
182. Id. at 573.
183. Id. at 575.
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is in-house or not is an irrelevant distinction in this context.  To start, plan
administrators have a duty to all plan participants and beneficiaries to inves-
tigate claims and make sure to avoid paying benefits to claimants who are not
entitled to receive them.”184
Absent from their discussion was the plan administrator’s duty to
plan participants and beneficiaries to investigate claims and make
sure to pay claimants who are entitled to receive them.  To prioritize
the duty to deny false claims over the duty to award true ones is re-
flecting a bias against the individual claimant.185  Notwithstanding
this bias, that the court presumes neutrality of in-house insurance
doctors—who are paid by the insurer and have access to the insurer’s
lawyers for consultation when needed—simply reflects how deep and
effective the partnership is.  The issue, therefore, is not how to elimi-
nate physician advocates but rather how to ensure that disabled
claimants have as much access to physician advocates as insurers
do.186
It should be noted that references to physician advocates mean: a
licensed professional who is capable of organizing the medical facts in
the light most favorable to his or her patient.  I do not conflate, as Mr.
Foley does, a physician advocate with a physician who lies or exagger-
184. Id. (quoting Kobs v. United Wis. Ins. Co., 400 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2005)).
185. Note that I am not suggesting here that this bias—the bias in favor of the group
over the individual—is incorrect.  The point is merely that it is a bias and should
therefore be acknowledged.  The court’s failure to acknowledge the bias inherent
in their own reasoning contributes to their failure to acknowledge that Unum’s
full-time staff necessarily worked to support Unum’s mission, which is biased in
favor of the group and against the claimant.  Ultimately, it painted Unum’s elab-
orate medical–legal partnership as some kind of neutral, objective, and trustwor-
thy source of information.  That Unum’s medical team was ultimately more
credible in its findings than Davis’s is not something that I would necessarily
disagree with.  But to find that they are more credible because they are less bi-
ased is unsupportable.  Arguably, if Davis had the resources available to Unum,
to assemble a treatment team that included a lawyer, it is entirely possible that
he could have amounted a more effective and credible case.  Or, alternatively, if
there was no credible case to be made, he could have saved himself the aggrava-
tion and mental and physical costs of litigation.
186. In a prior article I advocated for regulatory change that would eliminate govern-
ment and private insurer’s ability to extensively review claimant physician
records absent a determination that the provided records were somehow inher-
ently unreliable because of evidence that the submitting physician was not quali-
fied or had been convicted of perjury, or both.  I noted at the time the suggestion
was radical and not necessarily realistic but was proposed primarily to highlight
how far the disability determination system had drifted from its goal of providing
an income safety net for those who were too sick or incapacitated to work. See
Miller-Wilson, supra note 121, at 35–36.  Recognizing that creating medical–legal R
partnerships is how government and private industry have succeeded in persuad-
ing the judiciary that a particular claim should be denied, an alternative and less
radical solution to the problem of improperly denied claims is to ensure that
claimants have access to the same tools.
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ates the medical facts to such an extent that they are untrue.187
There is a clear distinction between false or significantly exaggerated
medical records or testimony and records or testimony that are accu-
rate in accordance with the physician’s best professional judgment.
The key is acknowledging that only a small amount of medical infor-
mation is “objective”: blood tests, MRIs, CT scans, and X-rays reveal
important information.  But they do not, in many instances, tell the
entire story of a patient’s capabilities.  A treating physician, who has
watched and examined a patient over time, is capable of delivering an
opinion based on both the test results and his or her observations
about what those capabilities are.  That a different physician is capa-
ble of giving a different opinion despite the same facts is neither unu-
sual nor a reason to assume that patients’ physicians are simply not
as credible as they used to be.
The key issue is that with the growth of disability claims has come
a burgeoning industry response to those claims: develop medical–legal
partnerships to review and respond to the claims so that denials will
have a stronger legal foundation.  Legally defining disability more
clearly is a natural way to try to gain greater accuracy and consistency
in determinations.  It is no surprise, therefore, that the courts have
been persuaded more often that the “accurate” determination is the
one that was presented by the medical–legal team rather than the one
presented by the lone doctor whose notes and test results undermine
his patient’s claim for all the reasons discussed in Part IV.
VI. CLOSING THE GAP: SEEING THE CREATION OF
INTERDISCIPLINARY PARTNERSHIPS ON BEHALF OF THE
DISABLED AS AN ETHICAL OBLIGATION
Recall the overarching quest for both public- and private-sector
disability income claims adjudication has been to achieve greater ac-
curacy, consistency, and efficiency in claims processing.  These goals
are intuitively important for achieving balance and fairness.  Analyz-
ing the legislative and judicial history of disability claims, however,
reveals that if anything, both the public and private sectors have
fallen farther behind in achieving these goals rather than gained pro-
gress.  Increasingly complex legal standards have rendered the ability
of the SSA and private insurers to process initial claims internally
more efficient.188  But the resulting decisions are much less often ac-
curate or consistent, and, ironically, cause an increase in the numbers
187. FOLEY, supra note 176. R
188. See Martin & Weaver, supra note 120 (stating the influx of new claims in the R
1970s led to reforms in the 1980s in order to reduce the number of claims granted
and lower the costs of administering the program). But see Terry A. Low, Eleven
Ways to Assure the Success of a Disability Claim, LAW OFFICES OF TERRENCE A.
LOW AND ANTHONY J. CANTA 1, http://www.lowandcanata.com/CM/Articles/Elev
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of appeals, which renders the entire claims decision process
inefficient.189
While courts and legislators recognize that the difficulty lies in the
gap between medical and legal definitions and constructs, their failure
to recognize how the SSA and the insurance industry have tried to
narrow this gap through the creation of medical–legal partnerships
has added to the muddle.  If we can recognize the effective response to
the increased regulation disability examiners have developed, we can
begin to advocate for similar responses on the claimant’s side.  Once
claimants also have access to interdisciplinary advocacy teams, there
is hope for more accurate and consistent results.
Furthermore, while many lawyers and doctors, as already indi-
cated in the introduction to this piece, have realized the benefits of
interdisciplinary work, such recognition is far from universal.  In large
part this is due to a lack of resources.  Re-framing legal representation
on behalf of the indigent disabled as a health-care issue rather than a
legal issue can result in greater funding for legal services.190  But this
is not always the case as funding for health-care initiatives has been
dwindling as a result of the current economic crisis.191
Medical–legal partnerships have not gained universal recognition
in the communities that serve low-income disabled populations be-
cause both doctors and lawyers continue to see these partnerships as a
luxury or an interesting innovation rather than as an ethical obliga-
tion.  Examining each professions’ articulation of ethical obligations,
and the specific legal context of disability claims, however, reveals
that this is not an accurate conclusion for the indigent disabled
population.
en-Ways.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/9FB9-
HCV9.
189. See Capowski, supra note 135, at 342–43 (describing the inaccuracy of the Social R
Security process); Low, supra note 188, at 1 n.1. R
190. Killelea, supra note 3, at 455. R
191. Killelea, supra note 3, at 446–47; Lisa Girion & Mark Medina, Hospitals Feel Ill R
Effects of Recession, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/
jan/14/business/fi-hospitals14, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/Q26A-YZYH;
Stephanie Kirchgaessner, US Hospitals Face Financial Problems, FIN. TIMES,
Jul. 10, 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/15a0ac02-caa2-11e1-8872-00144feabdc0
.html#axzz2dJLBkYbC, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/FEW9-G6AX; see also
Investing in America’s Health: A State-by-State Look at Public Health Funding
and Key Health Facts, TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH (April 2013), http://healthy
americans.org/assets/files/TFAH2013InvstgAmrcsHlth05%20FINAL.pdf, arch-
ived at http://perma.unl.edu/5X6S-R6BC (discussing decreasing federal and state
funding for public health issues).
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VII. CONCLUSION
In a hearing held on September 28, 2010 in the U.S. Senate titled
Do Private Long-Term Disability Policies Provide the Protection They
Promise?, Senator Max Baucus, in his opening statement, made clear
what should have been obvious to the courts:
Abusive insurance company tactics start with having doctors with conflicts
of interest review claims.  Many of these doctors are employed either by the
insurance company or by the companies that do a lot of business with the
insurance company.  These arrangements make it far too easy for the doctors
to deny claims, terminate claims, or reject appeals.192
So why is the fact that the insurance company pays their doctors
for their opinion not considered a conflict of interest for the courts?  It
is likely because this arrangement is, in fact, a medical–legal partner-
ship.  The medical–legal partnership on behalf of the insurance com-
pany is no more or less a conflict than that posed for the doctor who is
“paid” for his opinion by his patient.  So what’s the problem?  Not the
pay but the unlevel playing field created when an insurance company
can and does create medical–legal partnerships while the claimant
has no financial ability to create a similar advocacy team on his or her
own behalf.
One answer might be to ban or significantly disrupt such partner-
ships.  Whether this is advisable or feasible is beyond the scope of this
Article.  Instead, I argue for the formation of medical–legal partner-
ships, modeled after the in-house partnerships that exist on the gov-
ernment or insurance company’s side, but created to serve the
interests of the low-income disabled claimant.  This population, in
particular, needs this attention precisely because of its lack of
resources.
Much has been written about the lack of a true safety net for the
low-income disabled.193  This is in part due to the large denial rate of
192. Do Private Long-Term Disability Policies Provide the Protection They Promise?,
supra note 135, at 1. R
193. See Robert J. Landry, III & Amy K. Yarbrough, Global Lessons from Consumer
Bankruptcy and Healthcare Reforms in the United States: A Struggling Social
Safety Net, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 343, 347 (2007); Miller-Wilson, supra note
184; Thomas Bartlett Wilinsky, Mending the Safety Net’s Safety Net: The Federal R
Courts Study Committee’s Proposals for Reforming the Social Security Disability
Benefits Review Process, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1079, 1080 (1991);
Julie Turkewitz & Juliet Linderman, The Disability Trap, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/21/sunday-review/the-trap-of-supplemen-
tal-security-income.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/Q3PJ-ENXR;
David Wittenberg, A Health-Conscious Safety Net? Health Problems and Pro-
gram Use Among Low-Income Adults with Disabilities, URBAN INSTITUTE 1 (Sept.
2004), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311065_B-62.pdf, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/3L6H-VKT5.
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disability income applications.194  When a low-income disabled person
is denied social security or private disability benefits, or both, there is
an appeals process, but the process is long and there is generally no
income available while the appeal is pending.  The fact that the dis-
abled claimant must wait months, sometimes years, without any
source of income has a direct impact on that claimant’s health and
welfare.  Given this, it is easy to see how physicians’ professional obli-
gations towards their patients should extend to ensuring that their
evidence in support of their patients’ disability application is effective.
Likewise, an attorney representing a disabled claimant in a disability
income proceeding has an obligation to ensure that the evidence gath-
ered is effective.
Despite this, most of the literature surrounding medical–legal
partnerships uses language that implies these partnerships are inno-
vative solutions to the complex problems presented by the intersec-
tions of poverty, health, and law.195  These same articles argue that
doctors should learn advocacy skills and lawyers should learn healing
skills as a more effective way of advancing their patient or client’s
overall health and well-being.196  While I do not disagree with any of
these statements, they fail to acknowledge that these partnerships are
not new and, when enlisted by government and private industry
claims reviewers, have increased the denial rate.
Analysis of the case law regarding disability income claims adjudi-
cation reveals that there is a gap between the medical evidence and
the legal requirements.  Such analysis further reveals that govern-
ment and industry have tried to close this gap by utilizing medi-
cal–legal partnerships that work to show why the evidence submitted
does not meet the legal standard.  Examination of ethical definitions
of lawyer and doctor roles show that both are required to competently
serve and advocate for the welfare of their clients or patients.  Compe-
tence, in relation to service of the indigent disabled, requires knowl-
edge of the disability claims adjudication process, including how the
medical evidence provided will be examined by the disability claims
reviewer and the fact that the claims reviewer is, most often, an inter-
disciplinary treatment team.  In light of this knowledge, competence
also requires the corresponding knowledge of how legal definitions
should be applied to the medical evidence.  This, in turn, can only be
learned through interdisciplinary education, training, and
cooperation.
194. Annual Statistical Report on Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 2012,
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., (Nov. 2013), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/
2012/di_asr12.pdf, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/R4X8-64HT.  Unfortunately,
private denial rates do not appear to have been recorded.
195. See, e.g., Killelea, supra note 3; Scott, supra note 3; Tyler, supra note 3. R
196. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 3. R
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Acknowledging the existence of these government and private
medical–legal partnerships is important to understanding why creat-
ing these on behalf of the low income disabled is not only a good idea
but necessary for effective treatment and representation.  It is this
narrow but critical obligation—the parameters of ethical advocacy on
the part of both the doctor and the lawyer who serve the low income
disabled—that has been the focus, therefore, of this Article.
While the limited services provided to low-income communities are
understandable, they are not, as I argue, ethically justifiable.  Ethical
obligations of doctors and lawyers do not include caveats that exempt
these professionals when there are not sufficient resources for them to
be able to maintain their ethical obligations.
